Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice by Parchomovsky, Gideon
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1997 
Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice 
Gideon Parchomovsky 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, 
Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History Commons 
Repository Citation 
Parchomovsky, Gideon, "Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice" (1997). Faculty Scholarship at Penn 
Law. 1265. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1265 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
l.r!!,nl Thmry.;) ( l '197 ). ~H7-;)/i). Printed in the L1nitc cl Sta tes uf .\mer ict 
CopHight © Cambridge Uni,·ers it\ Pre ss l 't'i:!- :'o::! :-,:! ...- '17 :37. :->0 + . l () 
FAIR USE, EFFICIENCY, AND 
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
Gideon Parchomovsky* 
The fair use doctrine is at once th e most significan t and the most prob-
lematic qualification of th e copyright owner's right to excl usivi ty. An af-
firmative defense against copyright liabi lity, the fair use doctrine 
legitimates certain unauthorized reproductions of copyrighted materials 
that would o therwise be regarded as copyright infringements. Notwith-
standing its importance, "fair use" continues to be "the most troublesome 
[doctrine] in the whole law of copyright." 1 Throughout its long history, 
neithe r courts nor legislatures have provided a useful definition of "fair 
use" nor h ave they adumbrated its objectives.~ Since the doctrine's in-
ception over two and a half centuries ago,3 courts and legislatures have 
a ttempted to formulate, explicate , refine, and revamp the fair use doc-
trine. Generally, these efforts have proven unfruitful.-+ At best, they h ave 
resulted in various formulations of how to approach fair use questionsS 
that offer courts and users of copyrighted works scant guidance on how 
fair use should be recognized. All this would not have been of grave 
concern had judges shared a common understanding of fair use or of 
the principles that should guide them in deciding fair use cases. The 
problem is that they do not. 6 Rath er, the case law reflects widely divergent 
notions of the concept of fair use. The lack of consensus is best witnessed 
'] .S. D. candida te , Yale Law School ; LL.M. Un i\·e rsity of California at Berkeley; LL.B. Hebrew 
University, Jerusa lem. 
I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Avi Bell, Richard McHugh , and Pe ter Siege lman for invaluabl e 
contributio ns. I am especia lly indebted to Jules Coleman for encouragem ent and insightful 
comments. 
l. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2cl 661, 662 (2cl Cir. 1939). See also Robert C. 
Ellickson, ORD ER WITHOUT L-\W, H ow NEICHBORS SETTLE DISPL'TES, 258 (1991) (describing th e 
fa ir use doc trine as "a murky area of law"); and Lloyd L ·weinreb , Fair:s Fair: A Comment on the 
Fair U1e DortrinP-, 103 H -\RV. L. RE\'. 1137, 11 37- 38 (1990) [here inafter: Weinreb]. 
2. See generally Pierre N. Leva!, Toward r1 Fair Uw· Standard, 103 H.-\R\' . L RE\'. 1105, 1105- 6 
( 1990) [herein after: Leva!]. 
3. SPe gPnemllv William F. Patr y, THE F.-\ IR UsE PRI \'II .E(;I·: 1'-i COPYRIGHT L-\w (2nd eel. 1995) 
3-1 8 [hereinafter: Patn-]. 
4. !d. at 1106. 
5. Set', e.g., Pau l Goldste in, COP)RICHT: PRI NU PI.ES , Lm .\1\ D PR.-\C:TIC:E , § 10.1 at l 0 : l-1 0:2 
(2 nd eel. 1995) [herein afte r: Gol clste in , Copvrig ln: Principles] . 
6. Leva!, sujJm note :2 , at !lOb ('Judges do no t share a co nsensus on th e meaning of fair use . 
Earli er decision s provide little basis for pred icting later ones"). 
347 
348 GIDEON PARCHOMOVSKY 
in the mul tiple reversals' an d divided courts~ that have become the ha ll-
m ark of fa ir use litiga ti on . 
This unhappy state of affairs h as led some legal sch ola rs to conclude th at 
th e doctrine of fair use is impervious to generalizatio n s, and thus tha t its 
m eanin g sho uld be de rived "bv inductio n from concrete cases. "9 Other 
promin en t scholars h a\'e rej ec ted this skeptical conclusion , and have in-
stead sought to explain and , wh ere possible, to justify a particular interpre-
tation of the fa ir use doctrine. The th eories profe rred in suppo rt of th ese 
interpre tations fa ll in to two ge ne ral ca tegories: those that explain fair use 
in, broadly speaking, efficiency terms I o and those that see fa ir use as an 
el abo ra tion of certain communitarian ideals.! I Given that the doctrine at 
issu e is "fair use ," con spicuous by its absenc e is an explanation of the 
d octrin e grounded in m o re ge neral consideration s of fa irness . I ~ 
The various attempts to explain the doctrine by economic effici e ncy and 
communita rian principles are misguided . The most well-kn own and fully 
d eveloped accounts are internally inconsistent, nearly impossibl e to imple-
m ent in practice , and incapable of offering guidance to potential users of 
7. Six recen t prominent cases were reversed at every stage of review. In Rosem ont Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Random Ho use, Inc. , 256 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y), mv 'd 366 F.2d 303 (2cl. Cir. 1966), 
cerl. denied, 385 U.S . 1009 (1967) the Second Circuit reversed an injunction issued by the 
di strict court. In Universal City Studios, Inc.\'. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. 
Cal. 1979) , rl'v'rl, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rro 'd 464 U.S. 417 (1984) the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court 's findin g of fair use and then was reversed by the Supreme Court's 
ho lding for the defendant. In Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Na tion Enterprises, 557 F. Supp. 
1067 (S.D.N.Y) , modifil'(/, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rn)d 47 1 U.S. 539 (1985) the decision of 
the di stri ct court to award damages to the plain tiff was reve rsed by th e Second Circuit, which 
in turn was reversed by th e Supreme Court. In Salinger v. Random House , Inc. ; 650 F. Su pp. 
41 3 (S.D.N.Y 1986), wu'rl, 8 11 F.2cl90 (2d. Cir.) , rerl. denil'(/484 U.S. 890 (1 987) , the Second 
Circuit reversed the distri ct court' s finding of fair use . In New Era Publicatio ns Inte rna tional 
v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y 1988), a[j'rl on other grounds, 873 F. 2d 576 
(2cl. Cir. 1989) the distri c t court's finding of fair use was reversed on appeal. Fin ally, in 
Campbell\'. Acu ff-Rose Music , In c., 754 F. Supp. 11 50 (M.D. Tenn. 199 1), wu'd 972 F.2d 1429 
(6th Cir. 1992) , rn01 5 10 U.S. 569 1164 (1994) , the district court's findin g of fair use was 
reversed by the Sixth Circuit an cl then reversed again by the Suprem e Co urt. 
8. In the first two cases that reach ed the Supreme Court it spli t 4-4 and th us in both cases 
no opinion was issued . Se11 Willia ms & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U .S. 376 (1975); 
Columbia Broadcastin g Sys. v. Lowe's, In c., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). The Sony case was decided by 
a 5-4 majori ty ; sel' Sony, 464 U.S. 417; the HrnjJer & Row case was d ecided by a 6--3 majority; see 
HarjJer & Row, 471 U.S. 539. 
9. Weinreb, sujJia note 1, at 11 38. 
10. See, e. g., We ndy J. Gordon , Fair U>e as AfarketFailure: A Structural and t-'ronomir Analysis of 
t!u~ Betrwwx Case anrllts PredecPssor, 82 Cor.u~vr. L R£\'. 1600 (1 982) [hereinafter: Gordon, Fair 
Use] and .William F. Fishe r, Reconslru rlingthe Fair U1eDortrine, 101 H ARV. L. RE\'. 16:)9 (1988) 
[here inafter: Fisher] . 
11. See, r. g., Linda J. Lacey, Of Brrad and Roses and CojJyriglzls, 1989 DuKE L. .f. 1532 , 1584-93 
(1989) . 
12. \,\'e inrcb in his short comment on Leva!, sujJra note 2 , does n ot advance a full-fl edged 
th eorv of fairn ess or anything akin to that. Although h e deems fairn ess pertin ent to th e Hfa ir 
use" problem he to uts a case-by-case an alvsis and docs n o t o ffer a speci fi c test that can be 
appli ed to fair use d e terminati ons .. 'ite\•\'einre b, sujJm n ote l. It is n o tcworth\·that th e approach 
\Ve in reb intimates a nd th e \· icw I lav out in thi s art icle \arv d ra matica ll v. 
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copyrighted works. In addition, these accounts fail to account for central 
features of existing doctrine and rest on dubious normative foundations. 
Property rights are normally understood as conferring upon their hold-
ers th e power to exclude and to alienate. Thus, property rights are often 
understood in terms of control or autonomy over a resource that resid es in 
the right holder. The t~1ir use doctrin e h as established a significant con-
so-aint on the power of a right holder to control one 's resources. Such 
constraints typically call for a justification. In other words, the principle , if 
there is one, that underlies fair use doctrine should explain why some uses 
or takings are "fair" and thus do not require compensation, '"'hereas other 
uses are unjustified takings requiring compensation. Existing theorizing 
fails to produce the needed justificatory principle. 
After making good on my claim that prevailing accounts inadequately 
explain existing fair use doctrine and fail to justify the distinctions fair use 
doctrine invariably involves, I propose an alternative account that explains 
central features of existing doctrine, offers practical guidance, is imple-
mentable in practice, and is , in addition, normatively attractive. 
My claim is that "fair use" doctrine embodies a general requirement of 
fairness that is expressed by what George Fletcher refers to as the paradigm 
of reciprocity of risk . l'l At the heart of this paradigm lies the principle that 
liability should be affixed to persons who impose nonreciprocal risks on 
others. This principle is satisfied when a person creates a risk to others that 
is different in degree or kind from the risks to which this person is subject.l4 
Reciprocal risks, on the other hand, do not give rise to liability because they 
cancel or balance each other. To determine which risks are reciprocal and 
which are not, one ought to look to the customary practices and the social 
conventions that govern risks in a relevant community. 
Understanding fair use as an elaboration of the principle of reciprocal 
risk has two implications for how courts should understand and apply the 
doctrine in particular cases. First, only creators but not copycats should be 
potential candidates for fair use. This is because copycats who slavishly 
reproduce intellectual works impose a nonreciprocal risk on creators of 
copyrighted works. Second, only users whose takings comport with custom-
ary practices that govern creative activities in the relevant community 
should be able to avail themselves of the fair use defense. 
Although these principles fall short of supporting a bright line rule, they 
are clear and relatively easy to apply. 'While I do not claim that courts have 
consistently decided fair use cases in accordance with these principles, I do 
claim that a significant part of the case law is compatible with them. More 
importantly, these two principles are reconcilable with the constitutional 
13 . See George F. Fletcher, Frurness 1/1/(/ Utility i 11 "l in I Themy, 80 H . .>.R\". L Rr:v. 537 ( 1972) 
[hereinafter: Fletcher]. 
14. lrl. at 5cJ8. 
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and statutory provtstons that demarcate the law of copyright, and thus 
courts may apply these principles without need for any legislative action. 
The article itself is divided into four parts. Part I sketches the develop-
men_t of the fair use doctrine ever since its emergence in the English courts 
of Law and Equity to the most recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Part II describes and evaluates the prevailing efficiency and 
communitarian theories of fair use. Part III, the heart of the article, ex-
plores the relation among fair use, corrective justice, and reciprocity of risk. 
It also provides a rights-based analysis of the doctrine of fair use and lays out 
a normative theory of how fair use cases should be decided. Part IV shows 
how the paradigm of reciprocity of risk fits within the statutory framework 
and applies it to some of the leading fair use cases. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE: 
BETWEEN FAIRNESS TO EFFICIENCY 
The doctrine of fair use originated in the decisions of the English Law and 
Equity courts. A review of the early English cases reveals that, in its nascent 
form, fair use was a relatively coherent doctrine.lS The English courts 
regarded the copyright as the property of the author and treated intangible 
and real property evenhandedly.l6 The focal point of the fair use inquiry 
was whether the putatively infringing use of the defendant was legitimate. 
In particular, the courts looked to two factors: whether the putatively in-
fringing use involved "the fair exercise of a mental operation deserving the 
character of an original work"l7 and whether the second user had taken 
from the first with the intention of pirating (animo furandi) _18 It is important 
to note, however, that when the allegedly infringing work failed to meet the 
required standard of creativity, fair use was denied, notwithstanding the fact 
that the second user had acted in good faith.l9 In addition to these two 
factors-the nature of the second use and the intention of the appropria-
tor-the English courts ascribed some importance to prevailing customs 
and practices of trade.20 A fact that bears emphasis is the strict exclusion of 
public utility considerations from the fair use inquiry. The fair use inquiry 
15. See Patry, supra note 3, at 3. 
16. See, e.g., Tonsow v. Walker 3 Swans. (App.) 672, 680 (1752); also Mawan v. Tegg 2 Russ. 
(Ch.) 385,390-91 (1826). 
17. Wilkins v. Aikin 17Ves. (Ch.) 422 (1810); cited in Bramwell v. Holcomb 3 My. & Cr. (Ch.) 
737,738 (1836). 
18. See, e.g., Cary v. Kearsley 4 Esp. 168, 170-71 (1803). 
19. See, e.g., Roworth v. Wilkes 1 Camp. 94 (K.B. 1807); alm Patry, supra note 3, at 11 n. 22 
and the sources cited therein. As Patrv points out, the absence of aminus jinandi did not 
operate as a legal defense, but its presence operated "to deprive the appropriator of the 
privilege of fair use." !d. 
20. Doclsley v. Kinnersley Am b. 403,405 (1761) (No. 212). ("The court must take notice of 
the springs !lowing from trade; ancl though they cannot regard customs of trade as binding, 
yet will consider the consequences of them"). 
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centered on th e rights of th e co pyrig ht owner vis-:t-vis the alleged infr inger. 
The interest of the public at large was deemed irre l evant. ~l 
Th e early Ame rican decisions foll owed th e principles th at had bee n laid 
out by the En glish courts . The essence of th e fa ir use doctrin e that evolved 
in England was captured by Justice Story in hi s landmark opinion in Folsom 
v. Nlanh.'2 ~ Jus tice Sto ry began his opinion by describing two extreme cases 
of copying. At th e one extreme he loccned cases whe re the entire substance 
of a copyrighted work is lifted . At th e o pposite ex tre m e he located cases of 
copyin g for th e purposes of genuin e revi ew and criticism that do n o t 
supersede the o rigin al work. '2:i In-be tween cases were requi red to exhibit a 
"real, substantial conde nsatio n of th e materials, and intellec tual labo r and 
judgment bestowed th ereon; and not merely facile use of th e scissors."24 
As William Patry points out, Story's o pinio n in Folsom is laudable because 
it avoids the mistake of weighing th e interes t of the autho r against the 
interest of the public. Instead , it fo cuses on the question wheth er the 
defendant's taking was fair.~5 It is noteworthy that in this case the infringing 
work was an adoption of a se ries of books on th e life and writings of 
President Washington that was intended to serve sch ool libraries, and thus 
the public interest strongly supported a finding of fair use .'26 Nonetheless, 
this factor did not figure in Story's decision. However, public interes t and 
utilitarian considerations did not remain beyond th e ken of the fair use 
d e termination forever. 
Utilitarian considera tions have infiltrated the fair use analysis re latively 
recently. In 1966 in Rosemont Enters. v. Random H ouse, Inc.,27 the Second 
Circuit subordinated the fair use doctrine to the constitutional foundation 
of copyright law by asserting that: 
The fundam ental justification fo r the [fair use ] privilege lies in the constitu-
tional purpose in gran ting copyright protection in th e first instance, to wit, 
21. Tonson v. Walker 3 Swans. (App.) 672,680 (1752). ("Argum ents from public utility may 
be urged on both sides; but if this were more d oubtful still it is clear that injunction ought to 
be gran ted, because the n o tes were co lourab ly abridged or taken ... and only twenty-eigh t 
were added . . .. ") 
22. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 184 1) (No. 4,09 1) . 
23 . !d. a t 344-45. 
24. !d. 
25. See Patry, supra note 3, at 23 ("The error in modern fa ir use li tigation-avoided in Folsom 
v. lvfa rsh-is to stan with prec isely the "public interest" inquiry, whi ch may be expressed in the 
question, "Does the public interest favor enforcing plain tiffs copyright~" justi ce Story did n ot 
make the error of balancin g the inte rests of the author and th e public, but instead examined 
whe th er "defenda nts usc qualified as fair use with the fu ll burden of making ou t an affirmative 
defen se properly res ting on the defendant"' [emphasis in the original]) . 
26. More specifically, the clefendan ts copied ::1 19 letters of President Washington that were 
included in the original work. They die! not copy any of the narrative pans. The d efendant 's 
book conta ined 866 pages and was writte n in the form oLm autobiography. The orig ina l work 
consisted of twe lve \·o J um es. 
27. 306 F.2d 30:1 (2cl Cir. l%6) quoting Be rlin\. E. C. Publica tions In c. , 329 F. 2d :)41, 544 
(2 ncl Cir. 1964). 
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'To Promote the Progress of Sc ien ce and the Usefu l Arts." .. . To serve that 
p urpose, "courts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must 
occas ionally subordinate the copyright holde r' s inte rest in maximum fin an-
cia l re turn to the greate r public interest in th e cle,·elopment of art, scien ce 
and inclustry. "'2S 
Since Rosemont, utilitarian considerations have been gaining ground at the 
expense of fairness. Ye t, n otions of fairn ess ha\·e continued to figure in fair 
use cases alongside utilitarian notions. ?9 Th e fair use doc trine has become 
a h otchpotc h of fairness and utility. Instead of clarify ing the con tours of the 
fair use doc trine, the shift from fairness to effic iencv has resulted in a 
I 
quandary. 
Congress contributed to th e fair use conundrum when it codified the fair 
use doctrine in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. The statutory provi-
sion is best described by Weinreb: 
Having indicated tha t it did not intend to alter th e prior law or inhibit its 
furth e r judicial development, Congress adopted three considerably inconsis-
tent ways of doing nothing: simple reference to fair use, specification of wha t 
is fa ir use by illustrative examples, and prescription of nonexclusive "factors 
to be considered" in determining whether a particular use is fair.30 
The problem with the statutory provision is that it says too much and too 
little at the same time. 31 It neither defines "fair use" nor formulates a test 
of fairness. Instead, the section provides a non-exh austive list of illustrative 
uses-such as comment, criticism, scholarship, research, news reporting, 
and teaching-that may qualify as non-infringing uses, and then it enumer-
28. !d. at 307. It is importan t to n ote that the court neglec ted to m e ntion that the Constitu-
tion intended to "Promote the Progress of Science and Usefu l Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to the ir respecti,·e Writings and Discover-
ies." U.S. Con st. Art. I sec. 8, cl. 8 (emph asis added). 
29. See generally Robert A. Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, CO P'tRJ CHT FOR THE NINETIES. CASES 
Ai\D MUERJAI.S. 55 1-54 (4th eel. 1993) . 
30. Weinreb, supra note 1, a t 11 39 (footnotes omitted). 
31. In its entirety,§ 107 provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisio ns of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproductio n in copies or phonorecords or by any other m eans 
specified by that section , for purposes such as criticism , com m ent, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scho larship , or research, is n ot 
an in fr ingement of copyrigh t. In determining wheth er the use m ade of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered sh all include-
( 1) the purpose and charac te r of the use, including wh e ther such use is of a commer-
cia l nature or is for nonprofi t educational purposes; 
(2) the na ture of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amo unt and substantial ity of the portion used in relation to the copyr ighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effec t of the use upon the potential market for or ,·,due of the copyTightecl 
work. 
17 u.s.c. ~ 107 (1994 ). 
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ares four factors to be weighed by the courts in deciding wheth e r a particu-
lar use is fa ir. The factors specified in the section are: ( l) the purpose of th e 
use, including its commercial or n o n-com m ercial nature; (2) th e nature of 
th e protected work of the pl aintiff; (3) the amount ;:mel importan ce of th e 
parts that were reproduced; and ( 4) th e impact of the use on "th e potential 
marke t or th e value of th e copyrighted work. " 
The statutory text gives ri se to various problems. It remains unclear how 
th e illustrative uses and the list of factors are to be reconciled; wheth e r all 
four factors ought to be satisfied for a fair use to be granted; how much 
weight each of the four fac tors is to be accorded in cases of cont1ict; whe ther 
additional factors can be considered and what they are . Even more vexing 
is th e fact that th e statutory formulation fails to specify an underlying 
principle th at should guide the courts in hard cases. In sum, without an 
underlying principle, the statutory language offers very little purchase on 
the question of fair use. Even so , when the legislation emerged there existed 
a forlorn hope that the courts, most notably the Supreme Court, would fill 
in the statutory void and provide the missing principle . This hope did not 
materialize. 
Virtually all commentators agree tha t the Supreme Court fail ed to apply 
consistently the statutory provision and that its assay to make sense of it only 
added to its preexisting ambiguity.:~~ Unable to decide which of the four 
factors should control when they conflict, the Court vacillated among the 
various factors, and after a decade of confusing statements:l:l concluded that 
"the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of 
other factors ... that may weigh against a finding of fair use. "?.4 Further-
more , the Court did not confine itself to the statutory criteria. In particular, 
the Court clearly indicated that fairn ess and custom are still pertinent to 
the fair use analysis despite the fact that section 107 makes no mention of 
them .35 At the end of the day, the Supreme Court's interpretation of th e 
statutory provision is of very little value. Aside from exploring the four 
statutory factors and adding some extraneous ones, the Suprem e Court 
decisions provide very limited insights into the foundations of the doctrine. 
The various decisions provide neither a coherent theory nor a serviceable 
yardstick by which to understand what fairness m eans or requires in this 
context. More regrettable is the fact that the Court has not even attempted 
to illuminate whether fairn ess or efficiency should control the fair use 
mqmr y. 
32 . Si'P, e.g. , Fisher, supm note 10; Jay Dratl er Jr. , Distillinr; the Witrhes' HIPw of Fair Use in 
CojJ_lTi[;hl I.aw, 43 U. ML1.\II L. Rn·. 233 (1988) [hereinafter: Dratler]; also Weinreb , suj;m 
note 1. 
33 . In Sony, .Justice Stevens writing for th e majority sta ted that e\·e ry commercial use is to be 
presum ed unfair. 464 U. S. a t 451. A vear late r in HrnjJI'r & Row Justice O 'Conn o r writing for 
th e majority branded the fourth faCLor-th e effe([ of th e second use on the pote nti a l marke t 
for th e original \\·ork-as "the single mos t important clement of fair usc." 471 U.S. at :J56 . 
;q_ Crnnpl;e(/, :dO L'.S. at 579. 
30 . Hrn jwr & How, 4 71 U.S. at :)b:Z-6~. St'l' also Fisher, suj;ra no te 10, at 1679- 82 . 
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The current state of affairs exacts a hca\V toll on authors and users of 
intellectual works as well as on the public at large. In its present form the 
fair use doctrine significantlv adulterates the right of authors over their 
work. Furthermore, it impairs the abilitv of authors and users to ascertain 
their respective rights and privileges vis-a-vis one another. This in turn may 
lead to underproduction or diminished use of intellectual works. The 
incoherence of the doctrine mav also g-enerate excessive litig:ation}li 
/ (_..J l__) 
Against this backdrop, several attempts have been made to rid the doc-
trine of its incoherence and provide a principled test for cleterrnining fair 
use. It is to these attempts that I now turn. 
I I. ECONO M IC EF FICIENCY AN D COMMUN ITARI ANISM 
The existing literature offers two theories that seek to explain and justify 
the fair use doctrine: economic efficiency and communitarianism. Eco-
nomic efficiency is both a positive and a normative theory. As a positive 
theory, economic efficiency is aimed at demonstrating that law can be best 
understood in wealth-maximizing terms. As a normative theory, economic 
efficiency endorses the claim that "law should be made to conform as 
closely as possible with the dictates of wealth maximization.":\/ By contrast 
to economic efficiency theories, communitarian theories are committed 
neither to the concept of wealth maximization nor to marginalist models of 
thinking. Instead, these theories seek to promote social solidarity by incul-
cating certain qualities and ideas that are deemed virtuous. Because com-
munitarian theories put a premium on forming better communities and 
enhancing certain values, for the communitarian the individual is not the 
focal point, but is rather a repository of the interests of the community. 
Although the two theories differ widely, they do have something in 
common. Neither economic efficiency nor communitarianism takes indi-
vidual rights seriously. Both theories are willing to accommodate individual 
rights only to the extent that doing so will promote the values these theories 
seek to advance. Neither theory accords independent weight to rights, and 
both maintain that individuals can be used to advance the interests of 
others without securing right holders' consent. Economic efficiency sacri-
fices individual rights on the altar of wealth maximization. Communitarian-
ism is prepared to sacrifice the interests and rights of the individual to 
promote communitarian values. Both economic efficiency and communi-
36. Ser Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry inln the Merits nf Copyright: ThP Challnzgps of Conlistmn. 
Consf!lt, and Encoumgrmnzt Thmry, 41 ST.\N. L. RrY 1343, 1372 (1989) [hereinafter: Gordon, 
An Inquiry]. 
37. Richard A. Posner, THE PlWBLE\IS OF J L' R.ISI'IZL'Dl-:N<E 362 ( 1990). The term "wealth" in 
'·wealth maximization " is clef! ned as "the sum of all tangible and intangible goods and services 
\leigh ted by prices of two su ns: o ffer p rices (what people arc willing to pa\' for goods they clu 
not alreadv own); and asking prices (what people d emand to sell what they own)." /d. at 356. 
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tarianism violate the Kantian impe rative to treat rational individuals as ends 
in themselves and not mere ly as means. :'.K 
In the following paragraphs I will explore both the theoretical and the 
practical merits of the various accounts whi ch suggest that fair use should 
be grounded in eco nomic efficie ncy or communitarian principles. In evalu-
a ting each ,·iew I will foc us on three ques tions: Is it theoretically coherent? 
Can it possibly be applied by co urts to d ecide fair use cases? Does it explain 
prnailing legal practices? 
A. Economic Effi c ien cy 
American co pyright law has a utilitarian hue .:'·9 The utilitarian view of copy-
right is sustained by the constitutional language and is widely shared by copy-
right scholars. ·1° Nonetheless, two points bear emph asis: First, the doctrine of 
fair use is a judicial creatio n that evolved by a process of accretion inde-
pendently of th e constitutional text. Second, nothing in the constitutional 
text or the statutory wording supports the extension of the utilitarian view to 
the fair use doctrine. 4 1 The last point merits elaboration. Judge Leva!, for 
one, argues that the first statutory factor, which looks to whether the use is 
productive or transformative, countenances a utilitarian construction of the 
fair use doctrine : l2 This argument is flawed , however. Transformative or pro-
ductive uses may result in improved , unchanged, or diminished utility. Con-
sider, for example, the case of vitriolic reviews of books or movies. Doubtless, 
such reviews are transformative, yet the harm they cause to the author of the 
reviewed work can outweigh the benefits they generate. The converse is also 
true. Untransformative reproductions of works can sometimes be socially im-
portant. This holds true when the original work has not been published or 
has been kept away from the public1~ Nor does the fourth statutory fac-
tor-the effect of the second use on the potential market for the original 
work-point to utilitarianism. The sale of unauthorized copies of a copy-
38. See Immanue l Kant, Fl;NllA~ llNTAl. PRii'\ClPI.ES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 46 (Thomas 
K. Abott trans., 1949). For a discussion of this principle, see gennrtlly]effrie G. Murphy &Jules 
L. Coleman, PHII.OSOPHYOF L-\\Y 77-81 (revised eel. 1990) [hereinafter: Murphy and Coleman]. 
39. SPe gt'nemlly, Paul Goldstein, CoPYRJ(;Hrs HICH\\'.\Y 165-196 (1994) [hereinafter: Gold-
stein , Copvrig ht's Highwav] . 
40. Sel', t'.g., LeYal, sujna note 2; Fisher, supm note 10; and Gordon, Fair Use, sufna note 10. 
However, J e remy \1\'alclron ohserYes that "rilt seems psyc hologicallv unavoidable that rights 
grounded in utility will be taken as ends in themse lYes: too much emphasis on th e utilitarian 
character of the pre mises can undermine people 's sense that it is a right (as o pposed , say, to 
some defeasible presum pti on or rul e o f thumb) that is ground eel in thi s ,,·ay. "Je remy Waldron, 
From Autlum to Copien: fnrlividua/ Righ ts and Social \ia fu l's in lntdlertual ProjJni\', 68 CHI.- K£:-.!T L. 
Rn. 842, 8:JJ (1993). 
41. \1\'einreb , .1ujm1note l , at 1141. 
42. Le1·al, supm note 2, a t llll. 
4::\. See, e.g., Tirn e Inc., .. Bernard Geis Assoc iates, 293 F. Supp. L\0 (S.D.N.Y 1968), wh ere 
the public inte rest in ha1·ing as mu ch infor111ati on as possible on the assassinati o n or President 
Kenn edY \l·ei ghecl h c~\\·ill' in L\\or o [ ~dlolling th e in cu rporaLio n or unique pictures of the 
murd er in a hook on that subject; ({{so Weinreb, .1ujm1 n o te l , at II :13. 
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righted work may, in some cases, enhance social welfare by reducing the mar-
ket price of the work. E\·en so, the sale of such copies would be regarded as 
unfair under the fourth factor since it would adversely affect the potential 
market for the original work. The fourth factor is concerned solely with the 
distributive effects of a fair use finding. 
Neve rtheless, two comprehensive accounts that ground fair use in eco-
nomic efficiency can be found in the academic literature. The first is 
advanced bv vVendv Gordon and the second bv William Fisher. 
' ' ' 
1. Fair Use as i'vfadwt Failure 
vVendy Gordon suggests that courts should "seek[] a base for fair use in 
structural and economic considerations. "-H She begins with the paradigm of 
the perfect market. 45 vVhen markets are perfectly competitive, resources 
gravitate through consensual exchanges to their highest value users, and 
efficiencv is therebv maximized. In the real world , however, the conditions of 
j ' 
perfect markets cannot be satisfied; thus, markets arc fraught with imperfec-
tions, or as Gordon, following conventional discourse, calls them, "market 
failures." When the market fails one can no longer rely on consensual ex-
change to result in the socially desirable allocation of resources. ·Hi Therefore, 
Gordon concludes that in the presence of market failures, courts should 
promote efficiency by emulating the perfectly competitive markets. That is, 
they should vest the legal right in the party who would have acquired it 
through the market if it had been feasible. By the same token, the doctrine of 
fair use should be employed to correct for market failures. Namely, courts 
should award fair use whenever the second use is socially desirable.-±7 Gordon 
then crafts a three-step test for recognizing when fair use should be awarded: 
(l) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to the defendant is 
socially desirable [i.e., results in a net gain in social value]; and (3) an award 
of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff 
copyright owner.-lR 
The first problem with Gordon's account concerns her understanding of 
efficiency. Although some economists define efficiency abstractly, others, 
like James Buchanan, insist that the notion of economic efficiency has to be 
defined relative to a particular institutional framework. 49 According to 
Buchanan, efficiency is the outcome of voluntary trade under certain given 
44. Gorclon, Fair Use, sujJm note 10, at 1601. 
45. Jd. at 1605-6. 
46. !d. at Hi07, 16Hi. 
47. !d. at Hi13. 
48. !d. at 1614. 
49. See, P.g.,Jun es ]\!.Buchanan, Politics, Policy nnrlthe f\srn'iau i\IrnpJIIS, :29 Ec0:\0\IIC\ 17, 
19 ( 196:2) ('To argue that an existing order is 'imperfect' in com pari son with an a! ternati\·e 
order of affairs that turns out upon careful inspecti on to be unatlainahlc may not he diffe rent 
from arguing that the c:-.:isting orde r is pe rfect''); .1 ulcs L. Coleman , Risks .·\:\ll \\'rzo:\cs 87-1 02 
(l9Sl2 ) [hereinafter: Coleman : Ri sks and Wrongsl: :Vlurph\· and C:okman, sujno note c'.8 , 
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conditions. H ence , the outcom e of vo lun tar y exchange in a market like 
ours , which is ridden with transaction costs an d imperfections, is as efficie nt 
as the outco m e of a similar exchange under perfec t market conditi on s. 
Both outcomes are effici e nt. If th e Buchanan view is th e right o ne , the quest 
for efficiency is frivolous and the entire doctrin e of fa ir use is un principled 
for it on ly ac ts to redistribute wealth from orig inal authors to subsequent 
use rs. so Becau se the debate abou t th e correc t unde rstanding of efficiency 
has never been se ttl ed , I will proceed to examin e the th ree conditio ns of 
Gordon 's tes t. 
a. i'vfadwt failure. The first conditio n that h as to be m e t is prese nce of a 
market failure. In h er article, Gordo n identifies three types of m arket 
failures that plagu e the market for copyrighted works: anti-dissemin ation 
motives, positive externalities, and transaction costs.s l 
T h e first market failure identified by Gordon results from an ti-dissemina-
tion motives. According to Gordon, the problem of anti-disse mination 
mo tives arises whenever a copyright owner is disposed to forgo an economic 
gain in order to retain control over the flow of the informatio n that is 
embodied in his or h er work. 52 Although it is true that sometimes copyright 
owners m ay be so disposed, anti-disse mination motives by themselves are 
simply not a m arket failure. A market failure occurs when a user who values 
an asse t m ore than its owner cannot secure it through a voluntary ex-
change. Because it is a consequentialist theor y, economic efficiency is con-
cerned exclusively with outcomes. It does n ot inquire into the motives of 
the transactors. Accordingly, the anti-dissemin ation motives of the copy-
right own er are irrelevant. No infere nces as to th e relative value to the 
owner of th e copyright, o n the one h an d, and the second user and society, 
on the other, can be drawn from the refusal of th e owner to disseminate 
one' s work. If the benefit the owner derives from keeping the work to 
oneself exceeds the combined benefits of the second user and the public at 
large, the own er should re tain the work. 
The second market failure men tioned by Gordon is positive exte rnali-
ties.S3 As Gordon correctly observes, the info rmation contained in intellec-
at 2:28-29; Jul es L. Coleman , The Foundations ol Constitutional l:,·wnomirs, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
EcoNmiics: CoNTAI N INC THE EcoNO~II C PowERS o r Gon:RN.\tENT (Richard McKe nzie eel. , 1984); 
also Barbara White , Coase and the Courts: F.mnomirs for the Common Nirm, 72 low .. \ L RE\'. 577, 
603-4 (1987) ("In fac t a fu ndamental theorem of economics is that every society with a given 
am o unt o f resources faces a m ultiplicity of economically effi cient sta tes from which to choose; 
th e parti cular e ffici ent sta te toward which society gravi tates reflec ts that soc ie ty's value"). 
50. Th is applies with equal vigor to Fisher' s account th a t will be discussed be low; see tex t 
accompanying notes 75- 82. 
5 1. Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 10, at 1627-?>5. 
52. lrl. a t 1632- 33. 
53 . Externalities are th e effects of o ne 's acti\·ir.ies on others · activiti es and en titlements. For 
a !II Ore e labora te disc ussio n of the pro blem o f exte rn a li ti es sec Ri cha rd Corncs & Todd Sandler, 
Tt-tr TH EO RY oF ExtTR:-\ .\ t.ITILS, PL'Bt.tc: Coons .-\:-\ ll Ct.t: ll CooiJs 29- G() (1986) [herein after: 
Cornes a nd Sancll e r] . 
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tual works confers benefits not on ly on purchasers but also on third parti es. 
In te llectual works stimulate de bate and discussion , which benefit th e entire 
cornmun iry. s-r Nevertheless, eco nomists note that th e problem of externali-
ti es on its own is hardly compelling.:'l:J Nor does it necessarily call for 
inten e ntion in the market.S6 \Nh e n transaction costs are low and prope rty 
rights are well defined , th e problem of external ities simply docs n ot arise .s7 
But eve n conceding th at th e existence of ex te rn al benefits is a marke t 
failure thatjustifies inte rve ntion , it remains unclear how awarding fair use 
h elps co mbat the problem. The solution to th e p roblem of externalities is 
inte rnalization. Internali za tion can be achieved eith er by governm ent in-
terve ntion :~,fl or, when transactio n costs are low, by private n egotiations 
be tween the affected parties. :-i~ 1 In the copyright context, the internalization 
of ex te rnal benefits th at authorship generates can be accomplish ed by 
subsidiza tion of authorship and other creative activiti es . The doctrin e of fair 
use, ho·wever, is an inadequate m eans for subsidizing authorship. A fair use 
award can be viewed as a subsidy to subsequent authors at the expe nse of 
previous o nes.6° But, absent empirical evidence to th e contrary, th e be n efits 
that subsequent authors reap from the existence of the doctrine might b e 
outweighed by the h arms suffered by original authors. Therefore, as be-
tween authors the impact of the fair use doctrine as a m eans of subsidizing 
authorship is indeterminate. It should be emphasized, though, that the fair 
use privilege extends not o nly to authors but also to a vast number of use rs 
who are not engaged in authorship or creative activi ty of any sort, and it 
allows them to avail th emselves of existing intellectual works without com-
pensating the authors of these works. Consequently, for users who are not 
auth ors, the fair privilege creates opportunities for "free-riding." Thus, in 
the final tally, it appears that the fair use doctrin e may well be ill-suited to 
internalize the external effects of authorship and creativity. 
The third type of poten tial market failure is high transaction costs. That 
high transaction costs stifle the effective operation of markets for intellec-
54. To d etermine whether copyright protection generates ex te rna l costs and ex terna l ben e-
fits, we first have to clearly define the terms "cost" and "ben efit. " For an illuminating discussion 
of the subject see Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, ivfisrhief and J'vii,fortzuu (A nnual M rGill 
L ecture in JurisjJrudencP and Public Policy) , 41 McGILL L. J. 91 ( 1995) [hereinafter: Coleman and 
Ripstein]. 
55. See, P);., Steven N. S. Che ung, T'/w Stnu:turp of a Contmrl and the Thmry of a Non-f"'xrlusive 
ResounP, 13 J. L. & Ec:oN. 49, 70 ( 1970) (concluding that" [ t] he concept of "externality" is vague 
because classification and theories [the reof] are varied, arbitrary and rut hoc. For these reasons, 
theories generated by the concep t of "externality" are not liab le to be he lpful "); also, J ames M . 
Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubble bin e, Extemality, 29 EcoNOMIC.\ 37 1 (1962). 
56. See, eK, Carl]. Dahlma n , The Prol!lrm oJExtnn ality, 22 ]. L. & Ec:oN. 141 , 143 (1979) ("It 
cannot be shown with purelv conceptual analysis that ma rke ts do no t handle externaliti es: any 
such assertion necessitates an assumption that the governm e nt can clo better") . 
57. Paul A. Samuelson & ·william Norclhaus, Et:ONO!I II C:S 314 (14th e el. 199:2). 
58. lr/. a t 310-15. 
59. Ronald :ti. Coase, Fh r J>m!Jlm t ofS"orial Cost, :1 J. L. & Ec:oN. I ( 19()0). 
60. Sw Sonv, 4()4 tTS. at 479 ( Blackmun , J dissenting ). 
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tual works is indisputable . In sofar as copyrighted works are conce rned, th e 
cost of consummating a marke t transaction often exceeds by far th e value 
of the copyrighted material to the po tential user. Moreove r, high m o nitor-
ing and litigation cos ts preclude authors from enforcing their legal rights 
against infringers. However, th e problern o f transaction cost is not impreg-
nable. 
A possible solution to the problem of transaction costs comes in th e form 
of technological innovations . Paul Goldstein reports that in the near future 
n ew technologies will substan tia lly reduce negotiation costs be tween 
authors and users. Moreover, they vvill also allow authors to police unauthor-
ized users and exclude nonpayers . He sugges ts that in light of this techn o-
logical revolution , the fa ir use d octrin e should be abrogated, or, at a 
minimum, be con strued ve ry narrowly.hl 
A diffe rent solution to the transaction cost problem is the formati o n of 
legal institutio ns th a t act to reduce transaction costs and streamline trans-
actions. In the fi eld of copyright law these functions are performed by 
institutions such as ASCAP and CCC. 6~ These institutions combat the prob-
le m of transac tion costs in two diffe rent ways. First, by creating pools of 
copyrighted works63 they allow licensees to pay a predetermined fee and in 
return gain access to an entire repertoire of protected works without addi-
tional charges. Second, by collectively enforcing the rights of authors 
against infringers they economize on policing and litigation costs. 54 There-
fore , in the presen ce of such institutions the question for proponents oflaw 
and economics is not when fair use should be awarded, but rather, why have 
the fair use doctrine at a ll?65 
More astounding is the fact that not only law and economics proponents 
but virtually all commentators seem to agree that, absent transaction costs, 
fa ir use should be abolished. 6ti In effec t, th ey all suggest tha t authors' ability 
to charge should be the test for fair use: Wh en authors can charge for 
6 1. Goldstein , Copyright 's Highway, .1ujmL note 39, a t 223-24; see alw Paul Goldstein , CojJ)'-
right in the New !njimnation Age, 40 C.-\TH. U. L. R. 829, 829 (1991) [he reinafte r: Goldstein , 
Copyright in the New Information Age ]. 
62. ASCAP, the Ameri ca n Society of Composers Authors and Publish e rs, is a copyright 
co llective that licenses rights fo r publi c perform ance of m usical works. CCC, the Copyright 
Clearing house Center, li censes the right to re produce literary works. For a compre hensive 
review see David Sinacore-Guinn , Col.l .ECTI\'E ADMlNISTR.\TI ON or COPWIGHT .-\ N D NE IGH BORlNG 
RIGHTS (1993). 
63 . To become m embers in such institu tions , creators o ught to assign the rig hts to their 
wo rks to the institution and au thori ze it to li cense the wo r ks as it sees fit. 
64. See generall.\' Robert P. Merges, Co ntmrling into I.iability Rules: Instit utions SujJporting Trans-
action in !ntellertual ProjJerty Rights, 84 CA L. L. REv. 1293 ( 1996) . 
65 . This is because the existence of the fa ir use doctrin e threa tens to thwart the effective 
operation of copyri ght co llectives like ASCAP and CCC. Indeed, if fair u se is to be awarded too 
generously, copyright co ll ec ti ves wi II be unable to co ll ect an v revenues as users will a lways resort 
to fa ir usc arguments to avoid payin g. 
66. Sr•r', r.g., Goldstein , Copvrig ht 's Highway, sujml n o te 39, at :223-24; Dratler, sujna note 32, 
a t 294 (" It makes no sense to prm·idc a fa ir usc su bsicly to a use r II' he n a li ce nse cou ld be 
ctfic ien tly negotia ted "); also A1nerica n Geophysi ca l Lin ion v. Texaco In c:., 802 F. Su pp. I 
(S D :--J.Y 1992), af{il, 37 F. 3d 88 1 (:2cl Cir. 1994) 
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subsequent uses, fair use should never be granted. This test , however, is 
extremely odd, as the ability to charge by itself cannot possibly determine 
legal rights. A hoodlum might have the ability to charge protection fees 
from businesses, and yet no one would argue that this in itself gives him a 
right to do that. Similarly, I may be able to sell to you a car that does not 
belong to me, but it does not follow that I am justified in so doing. Absent 
an underlying theory of rights, the ability to charge is normatively meaning-
less. Therefore, to suggest that fair use is nothing but a means to overcome 
the problem of transaction costs is misconceived and ill-founded. 
Champions of economic efficiency will invariably disapprme of the 
above analogies. After all, from an economic standpoint, the point and 
purpose of copyright protection is to secure sufficient returns to creative 
authorship, and if the fair use doctrine vitiates this goal it should simply 
be abolished, and authors should be entitled to charge for each and every 
use of their works. The problem with this argument is that it cannot be 
sustained by any empirical evidence. Prior to the introduction of any far-
reaching changes in the existing copyright system it is useful to recall 
George Priest's quintessential caveat that "[i]n the current state of knowl-
edge, economists know almost nothing about the effect on social welfare 
of the patent system or of other systems of intellectual property. "67 There-
fore, the claim that the abolition of the fair use doctrine will enhance 
social welfare is merely an assumption that cannot support an adequate 
basis for normative recommendations. Furthermore, the abolition of fair 
use may not even be in the best interest of authors. As William Landes 
and Richard Posner point out, previously produced works act as raw ma-
terials in the production of new works; thus, the elimination of fair use 
will make copyrightable works more costly to produce.68 This leads them 
to the conclusion that from the point of view of authors, optimal copyright 
protection should be weaker than complete. Therefore, the call for abol-
ishing the fair use doctrine is problematic even when viewed through the 
lens of economic efficiency. 
b. Desirability of the transfer. According to Gordon the second condition 
that must be met is that an award of fair use should effect net social gain. 
To determine whether this condition is satisfied the courts are required to 
weigh the loss to the original author and to similarly situated authors 
against the gains of the second user and society as a whole. It is question-
able, however, that courts are capable of conducting this cost-benefit analy-
67. George Priest, \;\1/wt l~mnomisls Can 71,/l Lmuyen abont Intellectual ProjJerty, in 8 RESEARCH IN 
L-\\1' .\ND EcoNO:VIICS: THE Ec:oNOi\IJCS OF PuENTS v-:u CoPYRIGHTS 21 (I. Palmer & R. Zerbe eds., 
1986). Likewise, Timothy Brennan appears to be right to conclude that "[a] full economic 
evaluation or copyright policy is impossible because the complexitv or compe6tive interaction 
and demand substitutions among copyrighted works is beyond the capability of economic 
theory or clara to generate cost-benefit analyses.·· Tirnotll\'.J. Brennan, Cop_vright, Fmpnty rtnd the 
Right to Dmy, 68 C111.-KENT. L. Rn . 675.704 n.l01 (1993). 
68. 'vVilliam tv!. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A 11 l:'crmomir i lnrt!ysis of Coji!Tight !JtW, 18 J 
lxc.\J.. Sn ' D. :12:'1 , 34 1 ( 1989). 
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sis. 1i'1 Practicability h ;ts been , and still remains, the proverbial Achill es' h ee l 
of law and economi cs. In th e case at hand , three uniqu e features make a 
cost-benefit calculus especially diffi cult. First, intell ec tual works involve an 
emo tional dimension that cannot be assessed in monetary terms. Second, 
courts are required to ,·alue the social gain (or loss) not only to th e parti es 
in th e case but also to the public at large. Third, co urts must m easure the 
losses (or gains) of potential authors who are similarl;' situated to the 
plaintiff in the case at bar. The questio n is: Can \Ve practically expect courts 
to p erform this calculus successfully? I am afraid that this question should 
be answered negativeh'. vVhen the interests of so many third parties are 
involved, even a rough cost-benefit analysis is simply impracticable. 
The impracticability problern cuts much deeper, for it is the second users, 
not th e courts, who are supposed to perform this calculus in the first place. 
It is unrealistic to suggest that users will be able to immerse themselves in 
this intricate calculus when ever th ey have to decide whe ther to use a 
copyrighted work. Therefore, efficiency cannot guide courts and use rs 
through the fair use maze. 
c. The substantial injlll} limitation. Gordon's third condition-that the 
fair use award will not result in substantial injury to the author-appears 
either otiose or incongruent with her framework of analysis. From an 
efficiency point of view, the injury to the original author has no importance 
per se. Obviously, it is a factor that must be incorporated into the cost-bene-
fit analysis, but on its own, th e injury to the original author is not determi-
native. If, however, this condition carries independent clout one should 
wonder how it squares with the underlying goal of economic analysis. 
Gordon elucidates the need for this limitation: 
The substantial injury hurdle serves several functions. First, it preserves the 
incentive system at the core of copyright. Second, it refl ects a recognition that 
judgments courts make about whether a defendant 's use is value maximizing 
are rough approximations .... Third, awarding copyright ovvners a veto 
whenever their injury is substantial gives some guarantee that th e fair use 
system will not put them at an intolerable disadvantage./0 
The inclusion of the third condition not only injects vagueness into Gor-
don's account but also renders it somewhat incoherent. If economic effi-
ciency should be the benchmark in fair use cases, then the third condition 
is a non sequitur. If, on the other hand, economic analysis cannot unravel 
the fair use puzzle, why should courts follow Gordon's recommendation to 
look to principles of economic efficiency? For if the rights of authors and 
b9 . For a normati1·e di scussion of the institutional aspects of law ancl e con omi cs , srP.Jul es L. 
Colem an , !jfirim ry. Utility a nd 1\'m/th Mrnimizotion. i1 Hmsm.\ L. RE\. 509, :"'>4Sl ( 1980) (a rg-uin g 
that ew~n if economic eflic ienc1· should be maximized it cloes not follow th;ll courts ;mel agents 
should act to t hi .-; effect '' i thou t "'a further theory of institutional co m pctcncc '"). 
70. Conlon , F;1ir Lise . . llljmln o te I 0, ar Hi 19 (footnotes omitted). 
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copyright owners trump effic ie ncy consideratio ns, th e n a normative justifi-
cat io n for the doctrine sho uld be so ught in theories of j ustice , not eco-
nomi c efficie ncvJl 
I 
Gordon's account is in te nsion with itself. Its basic normative fram ework 
is problematic ancl inadequate lv motivated. Moreover, it fails to accoun t for 
th e fu ll range of existing legal practices . 
To be sure, Gordon makes a limited claim for the capacity of her view to 
explain existing practices. She does n o t cla im that her view comports 
perfectly with the case law. Indeed , significant portions of the existing law 
cannot be reconciled with her framewo rk. Three examples stand out: pro-
tection of unpublished works, parodies and reviews. U ncler the existing law, 
the unpublish ed nature of the work militates strongly against a fair use 
findi ng. 7'2 Such works gen e rate no soc ial utility, but nonetheless they enjoy 
a high er degree of protection. Often publication of suc h works against th e 
own er's will might enhance social welfare. Accordingly, th e attitude of 
courts toward unpublished wo rks cannot be explain ed on efficiency 
grounds. 73 Reviews and parodies g ive rise to a different problem. Sarcastic 
reviews and parodies usually inf1ict an irreparable h arm upon creators and 
might undermine their in ce ntive to produce intell ectual works in the fu-
ture.'-+ Such reviews and p arodies vary enormously in their importance to 
society depending on thei r content, and, as such, they may not enhan ce 
social welfare enough to offset the obvious and large costs they impose . 
Neverth eless, there is little doubt that such uses are fair. 
2. The Ince·ntive/Loss Ratio 
Like Gordon , ·william Fisher also touts economic efficiency as a possible 
solution to the existing fair use quandary. Unlike Gordon, however, Fish er 
does not claim that the existing case law is defensible on efficiency grounds. 
71. Indeed, Avery Katz concludes in a recent article that 
Modern Neoclassical welfare economics ne,·er was suited to the task of constructing a 
normative order for law. A normative concept [of econom ic efficiency] rooted in 
positivism and not even regarded as decisive in the ho m e field [i.e., economics] hardly 
could serve as an organizing concept ror a separate di sc ipline [i.e. , law] that traditio n-
ally trea ted normative analysis as a central part of its task. 
Avery Weiner Katz, Positivism and the Sl'j)({m/ion of Law and Fmnomics, 94 MICH. L. RE\". 2229, 
2260-61 (1996) 0 
72. HrlljJrr & Row, 471 U.S. a t 564: New f_'m Publimtions, 87~ F.2cl at 583; Salinger; 811 F.2cl at 
97 (2cl. Ci r. ). 
73. Indeed, William Landes suggests that from an economic efficiency perspecti1·e copy-
right protection or unpublished works created fo r private purposes (i. e., that are not going to 
be published) should be r elatively weak. William M. Lan des , CojJyright Protertion of Ll'llers, 
Diaries, and Othn Unjmblished Works: An l :"mnomir AjJjnoarh, 21]. Li::c.-\1. STLD. 79 ( 1992). 
74. Empi ri ca l data in the contex t of libel ac ti ons suggest that the m<~j ority of libel ,·ictims 
beli eve that mone\' damages cannot make good th e ir injuri es . Twenty pe rcent of the victims 
believe that no remedy can aclequate lv redress their harlll s. Sr'f Rendall P. Bezanson, .J ohn 
Soloski & Gi lbert Cranberg, L mt-:1 L-111 .·\:\ll THE PRESS !Vl\"n-1 .\0/ll RL\l.ITY l-28 ( 1987) . Alfred 
Yen mainta in s that these findings can be extended to authors wh ose works han: been parodied 
or ktrshh· rcvie11-ed. Alfred C. \ en, \\ hm ,·\uihurs \\i!ll.l Sell: I'rtmr(\', F(lir Use, 1/1/(/ Ijjl rienn in 
C:oj;yn,!l,hll-rtw, 62 U. Col.(). L. Rt·\'. 7~1 , 10:>- 6 ( [LJ91 ) . 
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Moreover, believing that th e prese nt state of' affairs is beyond repa ir h e sets 
ou t to reconstruct th e fair u se doc trin e acco rdin g to efficiency considera-
tion s. The co re of Fish e r 's e nte rprise is the in centive / loss ratio , wh ich he 
offers as a benchmark for fai r use cases.7·1 Basically, th e incentive / loss ratio 
is a sophisticated way of conducting a cos t-be nefit an alysis . T h e numerato r 
of this fraction represents the monetary ret urn the original auth or could 
reap if th e use in ques tio n were held unfair and the autho r could charge 
payment for any such use. The denominator represents the resulting loss to 
society from granting the author exclusivity m·er the relevant use./6 Put 
simply, the tes t compares potential loss to the au th or against the poten tial 
loss to socie ty. So far, Fisher's test is quite similar to Gordon 's second co ncli-
tion. He parts compa ny with Gordon in requiring courts not to confine 
th emselves to th e case at h and but rath er to consider all the possible uses of 
a copyrighted work in deciding a specifi c fair use case . In othe r words, Fisher 
demands that courts "determine the unive rse of activities vis-a-vis" the origi-
nal work that might be considered infr inging./7 For example, if a detective 
story can be the subjec t of a book review, a parody, a computer game, and a 
musical, courts must conside r all these activities in eve r y fai r use case that 
invo lves this story. Then courts should d evise an incen tive/ loss ratio for 
every such use and by ranking the various ratios d ecide which ac tiviti es 
should be deemed fa ir and which should notJR Although Fisher's account is 
coherent, it is d esperately impracticable . The doubts abo ut the practicability 
of this view are best expressed by Fisher himself: 
If such a comparative analysis must be employed in m ost cases, is n ot eco-
nomic analysis in this doctrinal con text hopelessly impracticable? The discus-
sion of the highly stylized case presented in sec ti on B was complex enough . 
If we removed the simplifying assumptions , limi ted judge's investigatory 
power, and burdened him with other cases, it wendel be ludicrous, surely, to 
ask him to undertake an inquiry like the o n e outlined above. Pe rhaps. It is 
hard to imagine a judge making even rough guesses at some of the figures 
critical to the calculus./9 
In sum, Fisher's account is a stimulating thought experiment that d e m-
onstrates the analytical vigor of economic analysis a longside the diffi culties 
involved in applying economic principles to real-wo rld situations. 
75 . In many respec ts Fisher's tes t paral le ls a tes t offered by Louis Kaplow in th e context of 
pa tenLs. SrY Louis Ka plow, Tlzl' Patmt-Antitmsl i l!lr'ISN!ioll: A RNtjJjJrrti.lal, 97 H-\R.\'. L. RE\'. 1813 
( 1984) . 
76. Fisher, sujmt n o te 10, at 1707 . 
77. /d. at 1706. 
78. Specificallv, Fisher suggests tha t cachjudge, after dn·isi ng an in centive / loss ratio for each 
putati\ely in fr inging use , sh o uld arrange the \·ariou s uses o n the X-axis in order of th e ir ratios 
ancl th e rc1ft cr plot a graph of th e "[n] et impact on economic effi cie ncy of forbidding eac h 
successive use ." Based o n this graph, th e judge has to dete rmine the usc at \l·h ich the nct-cffi-
cienc\· cun·c peaks and then declare all th e tt scs LO the ri g ht oft hi s p oi nt bir. and a ll the uses to 
th c left uf th is point u n f~1ir. For a graph ic d i llusll ~ tti on oft his cl(ct erm i nation , Sl'l' irl. at 17 Hi. 
79. /d. a t l 71S. 
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One last point on fair use and economic <malvsis bears emphasis. The 
existing attempts to justif)' the fair use doctrine on economic efficiency 
grounds are somewhat peculiar. The fair use doctrine establishes a strict ''all 
or nothing" legal rule. The existing rule offers two extreme options: If a use 
is fair, the second user can m·ail herself of it without compensating the 
original author; if it is not, the second use will be enjoinecl. 00 In both cases 
someone is harmed. A fair use finding inflicts harm on the original 
author;sl an injunction deprives society of useful knowledge. In the context 
of copyright law, it appears that economic efficiency could have been better 
served had the fair use doctrine taken the middle ground by allowing 
second users to use the original work and then compensate its author. Put 
differently, in a market so rife with transaction costs and imperfect informa-
tion , liability rules would probably outperform property rules in terms of 
enhancing economic efficiency.1-1'2 Thus, economic analysis is at a loss to 
explain why compensation should not be avvarded in fair use cases. 
B. Communitarianism 
A different approach to the fair use problem is presented by proponents of 
communitarianism. Bv their li£hts, courts must turn to communitv interests 
j LJ J 
and values to determine what uses are fair. Joining Fisher in his criticism of 
the existing interpretation of fair use, Linda Lacey recommends that courts 
should focus the fair use inquiry on the public interest, namely the commu-
nity interest.S~'l Accordingly, whenever an intellectual work is of considerable 
value to the community, courts should employ the fair use doctrine to make 
it available for the public. In other words, the greater the importance of a 
work to the community, the weaker its copyright protection.s4 In Lacey's 
view, the fair use doctrine should serve as a vehicle for taking from creators 
80. Under the tvpolot,ry of Calahresi and Melamed , the fair use doctrine constitutes a 
property rule, or at least a \·ariant thereof. Under their definition, a right is protected by a 
propertv rule when a transfer of an entitlement requires the ex-ante consent of the holder 
thereof. Liability rules protect entitlements by granting the owner a claim for compensation 
whenever the value of the entitlements is diminished by the actions of other people . .'iee Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, f.iahi!ity Ru!Ps and fnolirna!Ji!ity: One Finu of the 
C:athedmf. 85 H'.R\. L. RE\. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter: Calabresi and ::VIelamed]. 
81. The public also suflers an indirect loss when f~1ir use is awarded because any such 
award-by the lights of economic analysis-aclyersely impacts the incentive of the original 
author to create in the future. 
82. For many years law and economics literature has suggested that whe n transaction costs 
are high , liabilitY rules are superior to property rules. Sre, r.g .. Calabresi and !vielamecl, sujna 
note 80; Richard A. Posner, E<:0:\0\IIC: Ai\.\l.l:)JS OF L\\1" 57, 70 (4th eel. 1992). The most recent 
writings in this field suggest, however, that liabilitY rules arc better suited to enhance economic 
eff1ciencv than propertv rules under circumstances of imperfect information . .)'pe, e.g., Ian 
An-cs & Eric Talley, .)'ufomonir lJrngoining,·: Dividing r1 f.egrd f~'ntilfl'lnml to Farifilo/e Cosmn FmriP, 
104 Y\u L J I 027 ( 1995); also Louis KaplcN & Steven Sha\·cll, Pmjm /y Ru !es \)'!sus Uobility 
nufes: , \nf~'mnr!lllil' , \nrrlnis, ]()() I-I .\R\·. L. Rn·. 713 (l9l)(i). 
8c'l. Li nclaj. Laccv, sujna note 11, 1584-cn ( 1 ~m9). 
8'!. lr/ at 1587. 
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and giving to th e publi c with o ut even compensat ing authors for th e ir losses. 
This view gives rise to a variety of proble m s. 
Firs t, her approach is unpr in cip led . In h er view, the in te rest of suhseque n t 
use rs of in tell ectual goods and th e public at la rge should preva il over th e in-
terests of original au th o rs, but absent an account o Cwh:· this should be , the 
reco mrn endation canno t stand . vVhy should auth ors surrende r th e ir rights, 
inte res ts, and tal ents to advance the inte rests of th e public: Why sho uld they 
no t, a t ami nim um, be cornpensated fo r their labor? Lacey atte mpts to an swer 
these ques tion s by arguing that the assumption that autho rs expect re mu-
neration is flawed, but th e evidence she provides to support this claim is in-
adequate. At best, he r argument proves th at wh en they make the decision to 
create, some creators expect to be rewarded while o th e rs do no t. ~'' But e\·en 
co nceding that some autho rs are n ot moved by finan cial reasons, we still 
migh t ·want to compensate them on grounds ofbirness-whatever their ex-
pec ta tions. Therefore, her argument cannot carry the day. 
Second, Lacey 's view is susceptible to th e copyright paradox. Although 
Lacey's approach might promote the dissemination of knowledge in the 
short run , it will likely decrease, o r in the extreme eliminate, the dissemina-
tion of knowledge in th e lo ng run. For if auth ors care about th eir own 
fin ancial welfare th ey will put their creative efforts to rest. This, in turn, will 
lead to a dramatic decrease in the amount and quality of inte llectual works 
avail able to the public. Thus, Lacey's en terprise might harm the very inter-
est it seeks to pro tect. 
Finally, Lacey assigns to the courts the role of deciding what works are of 
social importance . But how are the courts to make this determination? H ow 
does one recognize an important intellectual work? In an oft-ci ted p ara-
graph, Justice Holmes warned th at "[i] t would b e a dangerous undertaking 
for persons trained only to the law to constitute the mselves fin al judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the n arrowest and most obvious 
limits. "Rti T his warning applies with equal force to other copyrightable works. 
Lacey h erself offers ver y littl e guidance on this matte r. She asserts that "politi-
cal information which con tributes to the debate about the very nature of o ur 
government and its p olicies, is of grea test value to a com muni ty. "i">7 This on its 
own is n o t very helpfu l. Thereafter, Lacey co ntends that the Supreme Court 
was clearly wrong in holding that off-the-air videotaping constitutes fa ir 
use .Rs This statement begs the questio n. Television program s often provide 
large am ounts of political and otherwise valuable information. The availabil-
ity of video tapes of television programs surely contributes to the wide dis-
semination of importan t info rmation , as it m akes these programs available to 
85 . frl . at. J:J72. The d ata Lacey offers suggest that 70 percent o f th e auth ors \\'llo publi shed 
at least o ne book are e ngaged in another 1mrk othe r than writing . No infe rences ca n be made 
based o n these data as to what impels au tho rs to create . The usc of these d a ta to su pport the 
a rgume nt that autho rs d o no t expect monctan· IT\,·ards is high h" inad equ;1t e. 
sn. Blci ste in ,._ Don a l d~on Li thograp hi c Co. , 188 U.S. 2:-\ll ( 1 90c~). 
87. Lacev, sujmt no te 1 J , at 1:)88 . 
88. !d. at 1:)91. 
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more viewers. vVhy, then, was the Supreme Court wrong? My point here is not 
that the Supreme Court was right, but rather that deciding what is important 
is completely idiosyncratic. It involves a value judgment that courts are ill-fit-
ted to make. 1Nithout an objective benchmark, which Lacey fails to provide, 
courts will face tremendous difficulties deciding uses of what works are to be 
considered fair. Also, the importance criterion will likely spur enormous con-
fusion among users . 
At bottom, recourse to cornmunitarian values cannot solve the fair use 
problem. vVithout a further theory, there is no apparent justification to 
prefer the interests of the community over the rights of the individuals. 
Moreover, Lacey's attempt to foster wider dissemination of knowledge runs 
aground as it is subject to the proverbial copyright paradox. Hence, her 
approach is , at least to some extent, incoherent. Finally, the benchmark of 
importance is too vague and subjective, and thus provides almost no guid-
ance as to how to determine what uses should be regarded fair. 
Ill. RIGHTS, FAIR USE, AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
A. Rights and Fairness 
To get a handle on the fair use problem, it is useful to begin with a rights-
based theory of copyright law-that is, a theory that treats rights in intellec-
tual works seriously. A copyright is a property right in original works of 
authorship. That the author has a property right in her works is of both nor-
mative and moral significance. The defining characteristic of rights is that 
they erect moral barriers that others are not at liberty to cross.SSJ Robert Noz-
ick, for instance, refers to rights as "side constraints" that "reflect the underly-
ing K:1.ntian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means. "90 
Ronald Dworkin characterizes rights as "political trumps held by individuals" 
that protect individuals from unbridled pursuit of collective goals.9l Indeed, 
according to the liberal tradition, the point and purpose of rights is to demar-
cate a domain of autonomy and control.92 Rights command respect even 
when doing so would preclude the attainment of otherwise desirable conse-
quences. Thus, as David Lyons points out "[i]f one accepts moral rights, one 
cannot accept absolute guidance by welfare arguments."93 The same holds 
true for communitarian considerations. Accotdingly, rights in intellectual 
property cannot be constrained just because doing so will enhance overall 
welfare or promote communitarian values.94 My point here is not that con-
89. Loren E. Lomsky, Rights without Stilts, 12 l-IAR\'. J. L. & P u B. POI:\' 775, 777 ( 1989). Ser also 
DaYicl Lyons, Utility and Rights, 24 Nm.tos 107, 111 ( 1982). 
90. Robert Nozick, AN.\RC:HY, SnTt::.\ND UTOPL\ 30-c)1 (1974). 
91. Ronald Dworkin, T.-\KINr; RtCHTS SERIUL SLY xi ( 1977). 
~12. SeeJ ules L, Coleman & J ocly Krauss, Rl'lhi u/;i ng thr Theory oJLegal Rights, 95 Y\LE L. J. 1335, 
1339 (1986). 
93. Lyons, Sltjna note 89, at 112. 
~q. The Second Circuit adopted this Yic11· in Iowa State L' nil'. Research Founcl. , Inc. ,._ 
Amcricm Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 6:21 F.2cl 57, b 1 ( 1 980) ("the L1i r usc cloctri ne is not a license 
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straints on rights in works of authorship are neverjustifiable , but rath e r that 
such constraints must be rooted in conside rati o ns that respect rights. That is, 
constraints of rights must be d efe nded in te rms of fairness. This, afte r all , is 
why copyright law allows a "fair use" exce ption and n o t an "e fficient use " or a 
"community be nefit" excep tio n. Impli citly, co pvright law recognizes that to 
the exte nt that rights can be co nstrain ed, th e legitimacy of d oing so is a mat-
te r of fa irness. 
In th e following sections I d evelop a conce pt of fair use tha t is sustainable 
on grounds of fairness and is, thus, co mpatibl e with a rights-based view of 
copyright law. Since I maintain that th e fair use doctrine has always been , 
and still is, inextricably related to th e conce pt of corrective justice, I begin 
my exposition by explaining th e dem ands of corrective justice . 
The basic rights in property are typically perceived as th e domain of dis-
tributive justice . vVe turn to di stributive justice to d e termine wheth er our 
holdings are fair. But whether or not they are fair, we recognize the n eed for a 
distinction be tween legitimate and ill egitima te ways of moving resources 
around . Even if the existing allocation of resources is not perfectly compat-
ible with any scheme of distributive justice, th e law will not tolerate certain in-
voluntary takings of property. After all, the ve ry conce pt of property implies 
security against the actions of others. Property restricts the freedom of others 
and limits the ways in which resources can be transferred. To determine how 
property can be legitimately transferred we have norms governing transfer, 
taking, or use. These are the norms of transactional justice, which includes 
corrective justice. These norms not only d e termine the legitimate ways of 
transferring resources but also what ought to be done about transfers that are 
illegitimate. Therefore, these norms e nsure respect for rights in that they 
protect rights against illegal transfers. So , the concept of property rights in-
variably invokes the idea of corrective justice. But to give corrective justice a 
meaning we need an account of what makes a taking or a transfer illegiti-
mate . That is what the principle of reciprocity of risk provides. 
B. Corrective Justice and Distributive Justice 
Corrective justice is concerned with rectification of losses that are brought 
about by private wrongs. By contrast, distributive justice is concerned with 
the general allotment of entitlements, resources, and opportunitie s. Ac-
cordingly, corrective justice gives rise to an age nt-specific duty to repair, and 
distributive justice imposes agent-gen e ral duties to repair. 95 
fo r a co rporate theft, empowe ring a court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the 
underlyin g work contains material o f possibl e public importance'' ). 
95 . A dutv in corrective justice is agent-spec ific because o nl y th e wro ngd oer, and n o o th e r, 
is obliged to make good th e losses o ne caused. A dutY in cli stributiYejusti cc is agent-gene ral in 
the sense that e \"l:n member of socictv is rc (juircd LO co mply with the cl c mancls of the just 
a lloca ti o n. Sw p,Fnt mfly Cole lll an ancl Ripstcin , .lujna no te 54 , at 9 1. 
368 GIDEON PARCHOMOVSKY 
Aristotle was th e first to distin guish betwee n corrective justice and dis-
tributive ju s tice.~H> In his view, however, correc tive justice is in eluctably 
re lated to distributive justice. For him the pu rpose of corrective justice is to 
restore th e proportionate distribution of entitlements that existed be tween 
the parties before a wrong has occu rred . Thus , the n eed to return to the 
preexisting e ntitlem ents imposed a duty to rectify the loss on th e injurer. 
The Aristotelian view of corrective justice encounters considerabl e difficul-
ti es in two kinds of situations. First, it does nor account for situations where 
the loss of the ,·ictim differs from the gain of the injure r.97 Second, and 
more importantly, in the A.ristotelian view, co rrec tive justice is d evoid of 
meaning when the prevailing distribution is incompatible with th e demands 
of distributive justice. Departures from an unjust distribution of en title-
m ents n eed not be rec tified as rec tification will only serve to res tore the 
preexisting injustice. Thus, the Aristotelian view fail s to provide an ade-
quate moral basis for the legal duty imposed on injurers to make good the 
losses th ey caused. 
A diffe rent view of corrective justice is assoc iated with Jules Coleman. 
In Coleman's view, the purpose of correc tive justice is to sustain real 
rights. Rights are real, and h ence sustainable by corrective justice, if they 
"are worthy of protection against infringement by th e actions of others," 
even if they are not defensible within the best scheme of distributive jus-
tice.9S The right to improve upon the existing allocation of reso urces is 
reserved to the state-not to individuals. Thus, the existing allocation of 
rights should only be sufficiently defensible on grounds of distributive 
justice to warrant defense against individual infringements.99 For Cole-
man , corrective justice is in a sense "tran sactional justice" as it ac ts to 
protect against violations of the prevailing transactional norms.IOO In that 
capacity the role of correc tive justice is to ensure that resources are trans-
fe rred in ways that are compatible with the relevant norms of the specific 
community. The point of corrective justice, acco rding to Coleman, is not 
to restore the preexisting allocation of reso urces but rather to ann ul the 
distortions caused by wrongful or unjust transfers.IOl The importance of 
Coleman's view lies in the fact that it provides a moral basis for many 
of the existing legal practices, while the Aristotelian view fails to do so. 
Consequently, the following analysis is based on Coleman's view of cor-
rec tive justice . 
9b . .-\riswtle, TilE 01J<:HO:II.-\CHL-\\! ETHICS, book V, ~9:1-30~ (v\'.D. Ross trans., 1925) . 
97. As Colem an points out, only se ldom clothe losses of\·ictim ancl the gain of th e injurers 
m·e rlap . .Jul es L. Coleman , M .-\ RKETS, MOR.-\l.S .-\.'<ll TH E L\1\' 186-87 ( 1988). 
98. Coleman. Risks and v\'rongs, supra note 49 , at ~1:'>2. 
99. l rl . 
100 . .Jul es L. Coleman, l ntdlnlurr! flmj;aty (1/1(/ Crmtrlitw j nlliu', 78 V\. L. Rn·. ~8?, , ~87 ( 1992) 
[hereinalh-r: Colem an , In te ll ectual Propcn,·]. 
]()I. !d. 
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C. The Scope of COITective Ju stice and Copy1·ight lnf1·ingeme nts 
Correc tive justice generates a duty to repair wro ngful losses. In Cole man 's 
lexicon, losses are wro ngful when they are the result of wrong or wrongdo-
ing.lo:z ·wrongdoing occurs wh enever som eone impermissibly and unjustifi-
ably h arms the legitimate interests of oth e rs . 1 0 :~ vVrongs co nsist of actions 
that h arm o r invade rights , regardl ess of whether the co nduct that caused 
th e harm is wrong in itse lf. 10·1 Thus, eve n in priva te necessity cases, the 
injure r has to rectify the losses he or sh e imposed on the \·ictim.w:o In 
Coleman's view, a person who in order to save h e r own life breaks into 
so meo ne else's h ouse will have to compe nsa te the owner for an y losses. 
Rende ring compensa tion is a way of acknowl edging and respecting the 
righ ts of others.l 0l1 
Unde r this se t of definiti o ns a copyright infringement falls in th e ca tegory 
of wro ngs. As Justice Story stated in Folsom, " [ t] he entirety of copyright is the 
proper ty of the author, "107 and, h ence , it is no different from real prop-
erty. lOt\ Generally, every unauthorized taking of private property!09 is a viola-
tion of the owner' s right. Unauthorized taking of inte llectual materials 
constitutes a copyright infringeme nt. By availing he rself of a copyrighted 
work, the infringer violates the property right of its author and, as is the case 
with real property, a copyright infringement gives the author a claim to 
repai r in corrective justice against the infringer. This moral claim to make 
repai r translates into a legal claim in torts. Recast in legal terms, an un-
authorized use of copyrighted works is generally a tort that e n titles the 
102. Coleman , Risks and Wrongs, suj))"a n o te 49 , at 329-3;)2. SrP alsoJules L. Coleman, Fort 
Uabilit.v and th f Limits ofCorrPclhlf juslitP, in I N H\R~ l "S vV'\Y 139, 141 (Jul es L. Coleman & Allen 
Buchanan eds., 1994) [hereinafter: Coleman, Tort Liab ility]. 
103. Coleman, Risks and ·wrongs , it!. at 33 1. 
104. !d. St'P also Coleman , Tort Liability, supra n ote 102, at 141. 
l 05. The classic case of priYate n ecessity is Vincent , .. Lake Erie Transportation Co. , 109 
Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 22 1 (1910). In this case th e defendant left hi s ship moored at the 
plaintiff's clock during a two-clay sto rm. As a resul t the ship was batte red against the clock, 
causing $500 in damages. The Minnesota Suprem e Court held that keeping the ship moo red 
to the plaintiff's deck was reasonable unde r the circumstances, but neverthe less it granted 
compe nsation to the plaintitl because the defendant availed himself of the plaintiff property. 
But Si'l' Ploofv. Puntam , 8 1 Vt. 471 , 71 .-\. 188 (1908) (a dock owner whose ser vant unmoored 
th e plaintiffs ship during a storm was held li able for the da mage th a t was caused to the ship 
and its passengers) ,. 
lO ti . Coleman, Risks an d Vhongs, supra note 49 , at ~H0-41. SeP nlsnJocl Feinbe rg, Volun lrn)' 
J:'utluuwsia and lhP Right to Lifi', 7 Pllll.. PL'H. AFF. 93, 102 (1978). 
107. Folsom, sujJra, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. D. ~ilass. 184 1)(?\'o. 4,901) citin g Bramwe ll v. 
Halcomb 3 My. & Cr. (Ch.) 737 ( 1836). 
108. Set. P.g., Frank H. Eastbrook, fntrlfn lu.al Projmly Is St ill Prof!nl\', 13 H \R\" . .J. L. & PLt>. 
Pou· 1 OS, 11 8 ( "L:cept in the rarest cases, we sho uld trea t in tcll ec w al pro pen~· and physical 
prope rty ide nti call v in the l;m·-which is where the brodcler cur re nts are ta king us in a sweep 
nu hull protectio n ,,·ill stop"). For a comprehensiYe discussion of the similarities and the 
difference bet,,·een intangible and real propertv, .\PI' Gordon , An lnqui n·, supm note 36. 
109. It is a longstand ing prin ciple of American co nstituti o nal law th~ll tak in g of pri ,·~ue 
prupcrtv cannot sene pri,·a tc ends. Se,, C:aldc r v. Bull '\ L:.s. ('~ Dall.) :\hS. 388 ( 17~18) (se riatim 
opinion); nlso Laurence H. Tribe, .-\\ tiRIC: \N Co '.'STITl 'TI 0:\.\1. L\1\ ~ CJ-:2 ~n · l:J7-:"i8 ( 1978 ). 
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mvner to legal remedics.11o This basic principle was clearly articulated by 
Lord Chancellor Elden in i'vlmuan v. Tegg, who stated that ''he who has made 
an improper use of that which did not belong to him must suffer the 
consequences of so doing. '' 111 Ye t, in copyright law, not e\·erv unauthorized 
use of a copyrighted work constitutes an infringement. Unauthorized uses 
that come under the aegis of L1ir use are specifically excused by the Copy-
right Act. Fair unauthorized uses are noninfringing. But 1vhat distinguishes 
unauthorized fair uses from unfair ones? v'vl1y should the latter be regarded 
as wrongs while the former should not? Is this distinction justified in correc-
tive justice? I posit that these difficulties can be resolved only bv recourse to 
the paradigm of reciprocity of risk that underlies the fair use doctrine. 
D. The Paradigm of Reciprocity of Risk 
The paradigm of the reciprocity of risk is generally associated with George 
Fletcher.! I:! For Fletcher the nature of the risk that agents impose on each 
other is the benchmark of liability. Central to his scheme is the distinction 
between reciprocal and nonreciprocal risks. Under this paradigm, liability 
in torts attaches whenever a harm results from a nonreciprocal risk taking 
by the injurer where the injurer has no excuse for taking the risk. I L) A risk 
is nonreciprocal when the injurer's activity creates an excessive risk of harm 
relative to the risks the victim imposes on the injurer. Reciprocal risks, by 
contrast, do not give rise to liability as they offset each other. The test for 
reciprocity is one of both degree and kind. Nonreciprocal risks differ in 
degree or kind from the risks prevailing in the relevant community. For 
example, in a community of motorists, the risk of an automobile accident 
is reciprocal. By contrast, in a mixed community of motorists and pedestri-
ans, the risk of a car accident between a motorist and a pedestrian is 
nonreciprocal. In the former case, no liability will attach should the risk 
materialize; in the latter, the motorist will have a duty to indemnify the 
pedestrians for the harm she caused them unless she has an excuse. 
Accordingly, liability in copyright law should arise whenever an unauthor-
ized user imposes a nonreciprocal risk on authors. To determine which risks 
fall under this category one has to look to the relationship among members 
of different communities of risk. In the context of copyright law the relevant 
communities are those of authors and of users (nonauthors). The relevant 
risk is the one of unauthorized taking. Put this way, it is straightforward that 
as between authors and users the latter impose a nonreciprocal risk on the 
former and thus should be held liable for copyright infringement for 
110. On the relation between correniYc justice and tort law, .11'1' gpnnrdlv Coleman, Risks and 
Wrongs, supm note elL), at 361-4::29, and Coleman, Tort Liability, sujml note 10::2. Richard A. 
Epstein, PmjHTly (/Jid Nrressily, 13 H.\RY . .J. L. & Pt_T •. Pou· ::2 (1990). 
111. 2 Russ (Ch.) c)85, c)90-9l (18::2b). 
11::2. Fletcher. sujml note 13. 
lU. !d. at :)51. Excuses arc high!\' irrele\·ant to copyright infringement cases. 
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unau th o rized uses of copyrighted works. As between authors, o ne has to 
turn to the p revailing norms and customs of the relevant community to 
decide whi ch unauth orized takings constitute reciprocal risks and which do 
not. T hus, as betwee n au thors, h arms that result from reciprocal ri sks 
should be d eemed fair. The preced ing analysis can be encapsu lated in a 
two-princ iple test of fa ir use. T he first principle h olds that on ly authors, but 
not copycats, should be entitled to th e fair use privelege . Th e second 
maintains that, as be tween auth ors, o nly uses that comport with th e pre\·ail-
ing custon1 ary practices in the relevant community of authors sh o uld be 
regarde d fai r. 
The first principle, by distingui shing be tween different communities of 
risk, identifies the pote ntial contenders for f<:1 ir use. The second, by focusing 
on customary practices and social co1wentio ns in the relevant communi ty 
of risk, provides the fine-tuning. Com·e ntio nal no tions and local no rms are 
pivotal to th e cortcept of corrective justice .!!-+ Having been created and 
sustained by behavior, m any of th ese norms and prac tices are n ot o nly fa ir 
but also efficien t.ll 5 By gen erating expectations-both epistemic and nor-
mative-they form a basis for coordination that benefits th e entire commu-
nity. These expec tatio ns provide a basis for individuals to pursue their plans 
and promote their welfare. Because individuals typically benefit fro m the 
existe nce of such n o rms and practi ces, each bears a moral duty to comply 
with them and sustain them even in situations where doing so vvill be to 
one 's detriment.ll6 
The two-step test proposed here h as several important virtues. First, it 
provides a principled method of deciding fair use cases- one that enhances 
both fairness and group efficiency. Second, by sustaining and reinforcing 
prevailing expectations, this test creates a basis for further coordin ation and 
planning. Finally, this test is relatively easy to apply. It does not require 
courts to perform intricate cost-ben efit analyses. Nor does it require courts 
to determine the importance of various uses of intellectual works. Courts 
only need to decide whether a certain use is compatible with the pertinent 
conventions and practices of the relevant community. ll7 In so doing, courts 
can h arness the knowledge of the litigating parties, who are generally well 
aware of the content of the prevailing n orms and practices. To be sure, 
disputes and disagreements as to the content of such norms and the exact 
boundaries set by them will sometimes arise. But based on the evidence 
11 4. Coleman, Risks ancl \Vrongs , sujna no te 49. at 358. 
11 5. !d. at 358- 59; Fisher, supra note 10, at 1681 n.lOO and the sources cited therein. 
11 6. Colem an, id. at 359-60. SPnilso Rich ard A. Epstein , fn llmwlional NPws Service v. As.\ocirtiNI 
Pn'ss: Cus/OIIl {/ nrl raw (/.\ Sol/ICI'S oj" Proj){')/y Rights iII NI'WS, 78 V.-'. . L. RE\ '. 85, 86 ( 1992) 
[here in after: Epstein, Custom ancl Law] ("'A ll persons who gain from th e use of th e custom 
genera lly may lose from its appli cation in a particular case. Therefore, wh en a di sp ute ari ses, 
the outcome effec tively binds th e li tigant, who now has n·en· in centi\·c to de ,·iatc from it '"). 
11 7. C ustoms an d com·cn ti o ns pb1· an important ro le in 1·a rious areas o f the law. Sl'l', !'.cr. , 
U .S. C. § 1-102 (pnllidi11g that the <t i,·n of the Cude is ··w permit the contin ued c:-:pansion 7lf 
comnH.:rci<ll pract ices through custom. usage ancl agreeme nt of the p<trti es'") . 
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adduced bv the parties, courts should be able e<1sily to resolve such disagree-
ments. 
IV. APPLICAT ION S 
This part sets out to demonstrate hem the suggested fair use test can be 
squared \\·ith the text of the statu ton prmision and to illustrate its applica-
tion in \arious cases im·oh·ing the fair use defense. f\Iv contention here is nei-
ther that the statutory text was tailored to fit my proposed test nor that courts 
consistently apply it. I do argue , hmvever, that both the text of section 107 and 
outcomes of many of the cases echo the two-step test of fair use offered here. 
A . The Statutory Text 
The preamble of section 107 of the Copyright Act contains a list of illustra-
tive uses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, scholarship, research, 
and teaching that might be regarded as fair. All these uses share two 
common features. They are all referential and , moreover, they are all 
transfonnative. Central to the very essence of these uses is the principle of 
drawing upon existing intellectual works in order to create new ones. liS In 
other words, all those who engage in these activities impose reciprocal risks 
on each other. Scholars, researchers, commentators, news reporters, teach-
ers, and critics expose each other to risks of the same order. Building upon 
existing works or at least referring to them is the point and purpose of most 
of the illustrative uses. It is impossible to imagine a scholarly \vork, research, 
or review that does not address preexisting works. To be sure, these activities 
do not require reproduction of copyrighted materials. Necessity hardly ever 
arises in the context of copyright law. After all, copyright protection subsists 
in the expression and does not extend to ideas.ll9 Hence, subsequent 
authors are free to use the underlying ideas of a copyrighted work as long 
as they do not copy the expression. 
Moreover, when there is only a limited number of ways to express an idea, 
copyright protection will be withheld altogether. 1 ~0 Commentators, critics, 
118. As Chafee pointed out "[t]he world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work 
of our predecessors. A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the 
giant. .. Zechariah Chafee, Reflations 01/ the r(/w of Coj)\Tiglit, ~Ei COI.L'\1. L. RE\'. 503, 5 ll ( 1945). 
119. 17 U.S. C. ~ l 02 (b) ( 1994) ( "[i ] n no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to anv idea, procedure, process, svstem , method of operation, concept, 
principle or di sccl\'e rv, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such \I'Ork"). The idea/expression dichotomv is a longstanding principle in 
copvright law. It was first introduced in the celebrated case of Baker\'. Selden , Hll U.S. 99 
(1379). See rr/11J Goldstein. CopHight: Principles. sujnrt note 5 , ~ 2.:~ ~lt 2::23. 
l:ZO. This principle is knom1 as the '·merger doctrine": \\1wn there are onlY a fe\1' wa\'S to 
dlcctin~ h express an idea. the id ea ancl its expression merge and no cop\-right protection 
~~tt~H : hcs. Set. e.g, .. Baker\'. Selden. 101 LTS. :)l) (1 8 /l)): \lorrisn \'.Procter & Camhk C:o., g79 
F.:Zcl h7:) ( J st Cir. l ~)()7 ) . 
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and sc holars are no t compelled to q uo te copyrigh ted materials or otherwise 
reprodu ce them in th eir works, yet th ere is a widespread custom that all ows 
doi ng that. T he use of copyrigh ted materials lends credib ili ty an d accuracy 
to th e new works. Ofte n, it is th e most effec tiYe wav to create so methincr ; D 
an ew. Virtua ll y all scholars quote fro m o ther scholarly \\·orks; all researchers 
make copies to carry th eir research furth er; and all criti cs make refe ren ce 
to the works they criticize . Such uses are sanction ed by th e prevailing 
conventions in the re levan t community of risk. T h e only use th a t migh t 
appear incon gruent is reproducti on "of m ultiple copies for classroom use ." 
H owever, Robert Ellickso n repo rts in this rega rd that '·p rofessors' substan-
tive norms seem to permit th e uncon tes ted copying fo r class use, year afte r 
year, of articles and minor portions of books. " 1:21 Thus, insofar as th e 
academic community is concern ed , the risk of copying articles an d minor 
portions of books m ay be reciprocal. 
Bu t the fact that members of the re le\·ant communities of risk impose on 
each o ther ri sks of the same o rder is not en ough . T h e risks sh oul d be also 
of the same m agnitude . That is why the illus trative uses are only presump-
tively fair. For examp le, I cannot copy Coase 's cl assic arti cle 'The Problem 
of Social Cost," add a concluding remark, and publish itjust by din t ofbeing 
an academic. Doing so would violate the pertinen t prevailing n o rms in the 
com m unity of academics. A further limiting princi ple is required . Hence, 
the fo ur sta tutory factors. 
The first factor requires courts to consider the purpose and character of 
the u nauthorized use. In considering this fac tor, the premium sh ould be 
put on the transformative n ature of the subsequen t work. This factor should 
be used to distinguish works that involve "intellectual labor and j udgment" 
from mechanical reproductions of existing works. In effect, this factor 
singles out authors and creators from copycats. Th e commercial n ature of 
the subsequent use should be accorded very little weigh t under the pro-
posed test. As Justice Souter astutely observed in Campbell, "[i] f indeed 
commerciali ty carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the 
presumption would swallow nearly all the illustrative uses listed in the 
preamble paragraph of§ 107 .. .. "122 
The second factor to be conside red is the nature of copyrighted work. 
Courts typically use this factor to ground a distinction between works of fact 
and works of fictio n .l 23 But aside fro m tha t, this fac tor h as received scan t 
attention.1 24 Under my interpreta tion the nature of the work is importan t 
because it de termines the conventions and customs to which courts sh ould 
121. Sre Ellickson , sujJm no te 1, a t 260. Hut see Pri nce ton University Press v. i'vlichigan 
Doc ument Ser vice Inc., 99 F. 3d 1381 (6th Ci r. 1996) (f ll bane) en/. rll'llil'd 11 7 S. Ct. 1336 (1997); 
also Basic Books, Inc.\'. Kin ko' s Graphic Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y 199 1). 
122. C:mnjibPII, 5 10 U.S. at 584. 
123. Sn~, r.g. , Hrupa d Row, 471 U.S. a t 564 (" [ t] he law gene ra lh· recognizes a greate r need to 
d isseminate fac tua l works than ll'orks of fan tas\ o r fiction ") ; also Patn·, .111/Jm n o te 3, at S()cJ-7. 
124 . See, e. g. , Le\al, sujJm no te 2, a t 111 () ('The nature o f til e co p\Tig h ted \\'ork is a facto r 
that has been onh· superficia ll Y cl iscussecl ancl li tt lc understood ··), a nd Pat.n·. id . at 505 . 
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look. Customs ~mel com ·entio ns Ya ry alo ng different inte llectual goods. 
Co nventions and practi ces th at apply to musical works may be out of phase 
with regard to liter;._n~· or ~ · i sua l works. T h e secon d fac tor directs courts to 
th e germane corwentions of the releYant community of risk. 
T he third factor focuses on th e amo un t and substantiality of the po rtion 
taken relatiYe to th e work in its entire ty. In de te rmining wh e th e r too much 
h as been taken , co urts should resort to the no rms and customs of th e 
re levant communi ty. If the subsequ ent use r h as not exceeded th e permissi-
ble, fair use should be granted. Only against th e backd rop of the pertinent 
community norms would courts be able to decide whethe r the taking was 
excesstve. 
Finally, th e fourth facto r concern s th e effect of th e unauthorized use on 
th e p ote ntial marke t fo r the original work. Under n1y in te rpre tation , thi s 
fac tor sh ould serve as a safeguard against excessive taking. An un authorized 
u se that impairs th e marketability of the o riginal work is a lso likely to be in 
violation of th e relevant customary practices. This is because the norms and 
conventions that govern activities are typically designed to enhance the 
welfare of th e individual communitv members. 
/ 
B. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studio Inc. 
In this case th e Supreme Court was asked to d ecide whether th e m anufac-
ture and sale of videotape recorders by Sony constituted a con tributory 
infringement1 2:'i of the responden"ts' copyrights in the ir television programs . 
Justice Stevens, writing for the mcyorit:y, h eld that Sony was n ot liable fo r 
contributory infringement on two different grounds. H e began by stating 
that the sale of copying equipment would n o t constitute a contributory 
infr ingement if the equipment could also be used for legitimate, nonin-
fringing purposes. In this regard Justice Stevens found that videotape re-
corders were capable of noninfringing uses, n amely noncommercial 
time-shifting by private use rs. H e added that it was possible that other 
television program producers stood to gain from the practice of tim e-shift-
ing, and thus enjo ining Sony from marke ting its eq uipme nt would harm 
them. Justice Stevens could h ave stopped here, but instead h e went on to 
analyze whether private recording of copyrighted television programs was 
excused under th e fair use doctrine. Central to his fair use analysis was the 
assumption that h o me users record programs solely for purposes of time-
sh ifting and not in order to establish private videotape libraries. This as-
sumption led Justice Stevens to pronounce, afte r discussing th e first fair use 
factor, that any private n oncomm ercial use is presumptively fair. 
125. T he rcsponclc n ts chose tn sun a copHigh t infringcm en t suit again st Sony, which mere]\' 
tn ~mufactured the equ ipmen t th a t co uld ha\'e been used in vio latio n of t.heir r ights, hut no t 
ag~t inst Som·'s customers, \l·ho per form e el th e ~tctu<l i u> p\·ing. Beuusc Som itsel f dicl n o t rc pro-
d uce th e protectccl works , the rcsponde n ts coul cl on I\' sue Son\' for a con tri bu ton· in fri ngcme n r. 
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i-\fte r paying sh ort tribu te to the second and third facto rs, Stevens turned 
to th e fo urth factor- the effec t of the unauthori zed use o n the market fo r the 
copyrighted work. Rne ning to th e fact that private recording for purposes of 
time-shifting was a non corn me rcial use of th e wo rk , h e reasoned tha t, typ i-
cally, n o n commerci al uses woul d not adve rse ly impact th e marke t fo r the 
or ig inal wo rk and rhus, in o rde r to prevail, th e copyrigh t owner has to prove 
"eith er th a t the particul ar use is h armful o r th at if it sh ould beco m e " ·ide-
spread it would adversely a ffec t the pote ntia l m arke t fo r the copyrigh ted 
work. " 1 ~6 H e then co ncluded th at in the case a t h an d the copyright own ers 
fa iled to carry thi s burde n with respect to time-shifting. 
Justice Blackmun , writing fo r th e dissent, stressed the fact that under th e 
Copyr ight Act the practice of unauthorized h om e videotaping constitutes 
an infringement. In rej ectin g th e fair use d efe nse h e reasoned that reco rd-
ing fo r p rivate purposes is an u n productive use th at generates no benefi ts 
to the public, and tha t it invo lves the reproducti on of copyrighted works in 
their entire ty. 1 ~7 H e the n cautio n ed that gran ting fa ir use in this case might 
erode "the very basis of copyright law by depriving auth ors of contro l over 
their wo rks and conseque ntly of their ince ntive to c reate . " I ~H 
Under the test proposed he re, the majority' s fa ir use finding in Sony was 
clearly erroneous. In this case , the first prong of th e test that requires th e 
unauthorized users to be creators themselves was n o t satisfied. Video tape 
recording constitutes a typi cal example of m ech anical reproduction of 
copyrighted materials tha t involves neither intellectual labor nor creative 
judgment. Thus, home users could not qualify as possibl e candidates for fa ir 
u se . By imposing on the producers the risk of unauthorized taking of 
copyrighted materials, the users created a risk of harm to which they we re 
n o t subject themselves. As the risk at bar was n onreciprocal, the co urt 
should have held the unauth orized use unfair and h ence infringing. 
Although Congress h as n o t taken any m easures to change the outcom e 
of Sony, it obliquely evinced its dissatisfaction with the outcome of th e case 
by en ac ting the Audio H om e Recording Act of 1992. The legislation of thi s 
ac t was triggered by th e em ergence of an advanced recording m e-
dium-digital audio tapes-that allows consumers to perform multiple re-
cor-dings of musical ·works without degenerating the original quality of the 
sound.129 The act strikes an interesting balan ce be tween the interests of 
copyright owners and those of users. On the one h and it prohibits infringe-
m ent suits for home audio taping. 13° On the o th e r it levies royalty ch arges 
126. Sony, 464 U .S. a t 45 1. 
127. !d. a t 478- 82 (Blackmun , J disse nting). 
128. !d. a t 489. 
129. Golclstc in , Copn ig h t's Hig h"·a,·, sujna n o te c)9 , a t 1:18. 
130. It is important to note that the ac t docs not sta te tha t ho m e a ucl iotaping fo r p ri ,·ate p ur-
poses is no t a copvright infrin gement. Instead , it prm·icles th at ·· no actio n mav be bro ug h t u nde r 
th is title all eging infrin gem en t of copnight."" 17 C.S.C. 8 100S ( 1 9~ ) 4) . According to Goldste in 
th e d istincti o n bet\\"CC!l '·c \:Cill p ti o n aga in st infringement ancl a p ro hibition against suin g fo r in -
fr i ngemen t"-~dth ough fin e-has a "'po11·erful s1mboli c cff"cct lor cupnig ht owners." lr/ . :tt I () ;). 
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on sales of digital audio recorders and tapes. Once coll ec ted, the royalties 
are to be divided among co mposers , lyricists, music publishers, reco rd 
produce rs, and performe rs.l 31 In effect, this legislation sanctions th e copy-
right owners' right to be indemnified for h arms that result from private 
unauthorized copying . Thus, Sony should be conside red an anomaly rather 
th an th e rule. 
C. H arper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Na tion Enterprises 
In this case, The Nation magazine got hold of a purloined manuscript of 
Preside nt Ford's then unpublished autobiograp hy that was schedul ed 
shortly to appear in Time magazine. Extensively quoting from this manu-
script, The Nation published a short piece on Ford's memoirs that "scooped" 
th e forthcoming publication in Time. This publication led Time to cancel its 
contract with the petitioners-Harper & Row-who owned the copyright in 
Ford's autobiography. Harper & Row then brought an action for copyright 
infringement against The Nation. The question before the Supreme Court 
was whether extensive quotations from a public figure's unpublished manu-
script come under the ambit of fair use. 
Critical to the majority denial of fair use vvas th e fact that the manuscript 
was unpublished. In evaluating the statutory facto rs, Justice O'Connor, 
writing for the majority, reiterated numerous times that the unpublish ed 
nature of the work tends to negate fair use. Also significant was the fact that 
The Nation's publication evidently caused an economic setback to Harper & 
Row. Justice O'Connor did not, however, confine the fair use inquiry to the 
four statutory factors. Custom and fairness played a key role in her finding 
that The Nation's use was unfair. Her opinion conveys a clear message that 
conformity with customary practices and notions of fair dealing are to 
weigh h eavily in favor of a fair use finding. She even suggested that the fair 
use inquiry could be reduced to the question "would the reasonable copy-
right owner have consented to the [particular unauthorized] use?"l32 Along 
the same line, Justice Brennan in his dissent suggested that The Nation's 
conduct was in line with the prevailing customs of the press industry.133 
The Supreme Court's recourse to customary norms and prevailing con-
ventions should be commendedYH Having found that The Nation's use was 
arguably productive and not merely a mechanical reproduction of the 
copyrighted materials, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the use 
131. For a more detailecl description SPf' 17 u.s.c. s§ 1003-1007 (1994). 
132. Hrnjm & Row, 471 U.S. at sso (c iting A. Latm an , F.-\ IR UsE OF COI'WIGHTW vVORKS 15 
( 1958)). 
133. !d. at 593. 
1'14. For another example of resort to industrv practices sreTriang le Publicati o n s v. Knight-
Ridc!er Ne\\·spapcrs. 626 F.2d 1171 (:J th Cir. iC)80 ). But SPP Fisher, .1u jm1 note 10, at 1680 
(arguing that il" courts ought to look be,·ond positiH: law they will not be able to iclentifv th e 
rcle,·<mt comentiuns and standards); and Le,·al. .111j!m n o te :Z, a tll:Zli (arguing that there is no 
.iustificttion fur considering moralitv <tS pan of the fair use inquiry). 
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was compatible with th e cu stomary practices and co nYentions of the n e,,·s 
publishing industr y. Both th e petitioner-Harper & Rcm·-and th e respon-
dem-T/ze Nation-were publishers and thus belonged to the sam e commu-
niL)' of risk. Moreover, th ey were both y;·ing for the right to publish first a 
news item-the memoirs of President Forcl. Therefore , the Court h ad to 
dec ide whether The Nation's appropria tion o f th e copnighted mater ials 
,· io lated the custom ar y practices gmerning news publishing. 
A rece nt article by Richard Eps tein ma,· lend som e support to the major-
in··s finding that The Nation's use was excess iYe re lati,·e to the ]Xe\·ai lin g 
custo ms. Eps tein contends that in the 1920s th e re appeared a customary 
prac ti ce in the news industry that prohibited misappropriation of n ews 
ite ms from rivals. 10"' The status of this practice at present is unclear, h ow-
e,·e r. l'vly aim here is not to defend the m <uority opinion in HwjJer & Row, 
but rathe r to champion the recourse to customs and community conven-
tions as a varclstick for fairness. 
j 
D. With a View to the Future: Electronic Mail Correspondence 
Paul Goldstein colorfully dubbed copyright law "the child of technolog-y. "l:lli 
Indeed, no other legal discipline has been affected by technological 
changes as much as th e law of copyright. Throughout the history of copy-
right law, introduction of new technologies h as created both opportunities 
for authors and copiers and shaped the contours of copyright protec tion. 
At present we are in the middle of an unprecedented information revolu-
tion wrought by computerization and innovative communication technolo-
gies. These new techno logies pose challenges for the law of copyright in 
general and the fair use doctrine in particular. 
One such challenge is presented by electronic mail. Assuming th at for 
purposes of copyright protection E-mail messages are no different fi·om 
regular le tters ,l37 then "addition " or "interspersing" reply messages are in 
violation of the original author's copyrightY>S H owever, under my proposed 
test such uses would invariably be fair. Everyone who uses E-mail for corre-
135. Epstein, Custom ancl L aw, su jmt note 116, at ~l7. 
136. Goldstein, Copyrigh t in the New Information Age, supra note 61, at 1. 
U 7. To qualify for copyright pro tection an expression must be fi xed in a tangible m edium 
o f expression. According to§ 101 of the Cop\Tight "\ ct, this requirement is satisfied when the 
embod im ent of the expression is sufficientlY permanent to permit the express ion to be 
perceived, reproduced, or othen,·ise comm uni cated for a period of more than transitorY 
duratio n . 'While it is clear that saving a wo rk in th e m e m orv of a co mputer is fi xation for 
purposes of copyright protectio n , Stern Elec. In c. 1'. Kaufman , 669 F. 2cl 852 , 85:'"J (2d c ir. 1982) , 
it is sti ll uncertain whether brie f fixation in a computer 's random access m em orv (RA!'d ) 
sa ti sfies the statutory requireme nt. 
13S. Stt. t'.g., \bureen O 'Rourke, f'mjHirty Rights nl fhp,-itrd J)ato, 41 FEn. B_\R. 0i t 11·s &J. :'"J!!, 
:J l -1 ( l ~ll)4) . :'vlorc spccificall\', such uses 111a1 1·ioLltc the a tt lhor"s exc lusi1·e right to prepare 
ckr i1·a tin· 1mrks based on the original cop11igh tee! 11-ork. Il e ne Kn~tblc Cons & "\i an U. 
Rtttcnbng. Xr/lligoti11g tl1 1' (;/olitillnjimnotion Sujmhi,!l,lnflll_\'.- . \ lJu!llj!Y liollll Un Al11'111f. S f-1.\R\ ' . .J. 
l.. & Tt :c11. '2.7:). :'118 ( I ~l%). 
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spo ncl en ce is essentially an auth or. Elec tro nic m ail is simply a m edium 
through which users exchange messages th at may qualify for copyrig h t 
protec tion. Thus, insofar as E-mail messages are co nce rn ed th e re is no 
distinction benveen authors an d nonauthors. Eve r y use r is also an author. 
,:-\ccord in gly, the risk of copying is reciprocal by nature in the community of 
E-m ail users. :r..~loreover, th e practice of reprodu cing the or igin al m essage in 
the re pl·y is commonplace in E-mail correspondence. Con seque ntl y, with 
regard to e lec troni c ma il correspondence , copying of whole m essages is a 
reciprocal risk , and h arm s that mav stem frOill it sh ould not give rise to 
copyright liabilitv. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mv aim in this article h as been to demonstrate that th e fair use doctrine 
I 
should be understood and interpre ted within the framework of correc tive 
justice. In doing so, I have sh own that all attempts to explicate the d octri ne 
on other grounds have failed. The thrust of this article is that the paradigm 
of reciprocity of risk should guide courts and users of intellectual works in 
deciding what uses are fair. Specifically, I have proffered a tlvo-prong test for 
d ete rmining what uses are fair. The first prong provides that in the sph ere 
of un authorized uses only the ones that are productive or transformative 
can possibly qualify as fair. The second holds that, of the group of produc-
tive uses, only the subset that does not violate the customary practices and 
con ve ntions of the relevant community of creators be awarded fair use . 
Understood properly, the fair use doctrine is a relatively coherent doc-
trine that aims to do justice between authors and unauthorized users of 
thei r works. Striking the balance benveen authors and subsequent users 
according to the proposed test will lead to an outcome that is both fair and 
efficie nt. Furthermore, by creating conformity between the law and the 
expecta tions of the party, the proposed test will en able authors and users to 
plan and pursue their creative endeavors , thereby enriching the culture and 
knowledge of us all. 
